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 ABSTRACT: 
 
US FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD SOUTHERN AFRICA - 1975 TO 
1990: THE CASE OF THE NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE 
STRUGGLE 
 
Herman Pule Diamonds 
 
MA thesis, Political Studies Department of the University of the Western 
Cape. 
 
 
In this thesis, I investigated, and offer a balanced overview of the US foreign 
policy at different levels of detail and sophistication.  This is done against 
the backdrop of the emergence of a new culture of the political struggles for 
self-determination. 
 
This study, in contrast to contemporary held views relating to the US policy 
premises, aims to look at the inherent disabilities and inconsistencies of the 
policies of successive Washington administrations.  More so, it investigates 
the US interventionist strategies to perceived threats from communist 
regimes and their allies, especially in Southern Africa.  To be able to embark 
on such an investigation, Namibia and the Soviet-Cuban involvement in 
Southern Africa were selected as a special focus of this study.  This thesis 
submits that the US foreign policy tends to be more inward-looking during 
the 1970s and 1980s, in the face of the genuine aspirations for freedom, 
justice and equality.  It is further submitted that this militated against the US 
human rights credibility. 
 
In getting to interrogate such observations, this thesis analyzes the policy of 
benign neglect adopted by the Nixon-Carter administrations, which reached 
its climax during the Reagan era.  This, however, it is submitted, changed as 
it was becoming evidently clear that the Soviets were involved in the sub-
region.  Prior to 1975, Southern Africa appeared to be of no significance to 
the US foreign policy architects.  The Nixon administration found it 
convenient enough to believe that there was little or no Soviet involvement 
in the sub-region. 
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 A paradigm shift, however, occurred which did not necessarily represent the 
US strategic and economic interest, but rather to counter what was then 
termed the “red danger” or the “roll-back Communism campaign”; thus the 
perceived Sovietization of the sub-region had to be stopped at all costs. 
 
The author argues that the US policies towards this region were on 
numerous occasions redefined and operationalized on the basis of perceived 
communist threats that were regarded as harmful to its interest.  Therefore, 
insurmountable pressure, were put on national liberation movements in the 
region, to sever their ties with the Soviet Union.  This would then perfectly 
tie-in with the US anti-Sovietization policies. 
 
This thesis in the subsequent sections, investigates in great detail the 
question as to why independence for Namibia was only acceded to in 1988, 
a decade after the initial agreement was concluded.  This pertinent 
observation is covered under subheading resolution 435 of 1978 versus 
obstructionism.  We found that South Africa was roped in, and played a 
significant role for the delay in the early implementation of the Namibian 
peace plan.  Suggestions on how these political and ideological differences 
could have been resolved are made, rather than keeping the Namibian 
question hostage to the then Cold War rivalry.  It highlights the 
misconceptions and complete misplacement of the US policy strategies with 
regard to African political and diplomatic strategies.  It is submitted that the 
greatness of the power of the US certainly knew no boundaries, even to the 
extent where it could trample on the freedom aspirations of others. 
 
This study suggests that the mere association of national liberation 
movements with the then Soviet Union did not result in transplanting and 
reconstituting communist models in Southern Africa.  Suffice to say, the US 
itself did not transplant the autocratic monarchist systems of its French and 
Spanish Bourbon allies after its declaration of independence.  Instead, it 
opted for a democratic federal republican system of governance.  Southern 
Africa’s struggles and the nature of the political process geared toward the 
attainment of national independence and self-determination were genuine 
expressions and aspirations for freedom, justice and equality as opposed to 
colonialism and apartheid. 
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 PREFACE: 
 
A relentless body of critical research and analysis concerning the evolving 
political processes in Southern Africa has arisen in the wake of the mid-
1970s. This prompted me to undertake this study with my desire to expose 
those factors that impacted on the politics of this region, particularly when 
taking stock of the then existing world order and the subsequent collapse of 
the former Soviet Union. 
 
This study calls into question, the fundamental power relations of the then 
bi-polar world that at the time succeeded in creating client states in this sub-
region. These in turn would serve the economic, political and strategic 
interests of the most powerful nations, and their imperialist tendencies, thus 
taking complete advantage of the then East-West rivalry. 
 
It hopes to do this without raising alarm for resignation and complete 
dependency, but to rather bring into common perspective the elements that 
conceived the reshaping of the geo-political equilibrium, which addressed 
the “North’s” needs “to protect our sources of energy and raw materials”. 
 
Finally, it is a study intended to be a source of comment and analysis on 
topical issues for further scholarly undertakings aimed at understanding the 
politics of yesteryear. It is geared towards social transformation in the future, 
particularly the brave and relentless struggles for national liberation and 
independence, especially in Namibia. 
 
x   
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1. Introduction 
 
The winds of change for national liberation and independence definitely 
shifted towards the southern tip of Africa.  This indeed was quite evident as 
the 1970s, drew to a close.  In most Southern African countries, a great 
charade had developed, which saw the emergence of a new culture of the 
political struggles for self-determination.  Whether this new trend would 
hold dear to the aspirations of the masses, which could be translated into 
genuine social transformation, meaningful and equitable economic co-
operation and development, remained to be seen.  Given these observations, 
I came to recognize that the then Cold War rhetoric and threats have since 
passed.  It is known to every reader of contemporary politics that Africa’s 
and in particular Southern Africa’s malaise was substantially not of its own 
making.  It was manufactured elsewhere – the West – and exported.  In fact, 
it is the function of the world’s capitalist crisis in which the Third World 
were caught up.  It in turn made way for coercion and the further 
marginalization of the African continent. 
 
It should be noted that given these assumptions, and of course against the 
background of the then Cold War, the internal processes of development in 
most of Africa had grounded to a halt.  This by implication short-circuited 
advances to democracy as promised at independence.  Of particular 
importance in this respect is the manner in which the US foreign policy 
evolved.  Added to this, is the manner in which it impacted on the nature of 
the politics of this region.  This thesis aims to present diverse viewpoints, 
using a broad range of literature in the field of political studies, such as 
published data from research reports, dissertations, periodicals, text books, 
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including oral communications with experts in the field, which will then be 
compared to empirical findings based on observations and interpretations. 
 
This research also attempt to shed light on the concept of power-sharing as 
advocated by consecutive US administrations.  It must be said that these 
were indeed deliberate attempts aimed at reshaping the politics of the region 
in the US favour.  It goes without saying that such manoeuvres militated 
against the concept of democracy, which in essence is about choices.  The 
struggles in Africa were about land, which indeed was a long haul.  Equally, 
the same logic applies to imperialism and neo-colonialism, which indeed 
took great advantage – and succeeded – of fragile and unstable regimes in 
their infancy at independence.  It is a view held by most readers of politics 
that the granting of independence in part emanates from pressures of the US.  
The objective here; was to carve out its own spheres of influence.  A 
political evolution that was both complex and pervasive; it permeated all 
aspects of society – economic, social, political and cultural. 
 
The contention is that Africa’s movement to political freedom and social 
emancipation should encapsulate as its primary objective the liberation from 
ethnic and tribal hatred, as well.  Besides, the factors underlying the 
continent’s never-ending political violence and civil conflagration are still 
prevalent: human rights, poverty and self-determination.  Another factor 
worth mentioning here has been the almost total absence of mechanisms, or 
otherwise neglect by continental and regional institutions to anticipate and 
intervene in resolving emergent conflicts.  The OAU whose mandate also 
permeated conflict resolution and prevention shirked this responsibility for 
much of the post-colonial period.  As a result minor political disputes 
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escalated into full-blown civil conflagration until foreign powers intervene 
to impose a settlement.  Unfortunately, foreign interventions never provided 
the desired results.  Moreover, these interventions at best lacked an African 
input and were rather reactive than preventive. 
 
The march to genuine independence is a tall order.  Suffice to say, the 
attainment of a populist independence itself set in motion new processes.  
This is the emergence of a new class structure that simultaneously affected 
all other classes and the way society functioned.  Developmental theorists 
are of the opinion that economic exploitation occurred in tandem with 
political, ideological, cultural and other forms of sub-ordination.  These in 
turn reinforced dependency within the framework of Western imperialism.  
It is against this backdrop, that the ever-changing, but parallel objectives of 
successive US administrations’ foreign policies should be examined.  There 
is stark evidence of the persisting features of imperialist presence across 
Africa.  Western colonialism never really withdrew after conceding 
independence. (1) 
 
 
A close bearing on such tendency was the interventionist posture of the US 
since 1945, which came to find prominence during the Reagan revolution in 
the late 1980s.  The foreign policy pursued by President Reagan was 
congruent with its assumed role as an imperial state exercising global 
_________________________________ 
1. Turok, B 1987. Africa:What can be done? Bath Press. 1-22  
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hegemony in defence of capitalism.  President Reagan interpreted all foreign 
policy in terms of global considerations of the US-Soviet rivalry.  Conflicts 
in Southern Africa were understood, not in their own terms, but rather as 
extensions of superpower competition.  This in turn led to the responses and 
policies that were formulated accordingly, especially during the Reagan era. 
(2) 
 
 
   
Western policies toward Africa began as a private affair directed by 
missionaries and traders.  While individuals and private organizations saw a 
continent of great spiritual, material and cartographic importance, leaders 
from the West held the belief that politically, Africa was irrelevant.  This 
however, changed during the 1870s and 1880s.  Indifference gave way to a 
frenzied scramble for territorial influence, which is still prevalent today.  As 
such, the 1884 Berlin Conference, which saw the compartmentalization of 
Africa ushered in a century during which the colonial powers used the 
continent as a field with which to play out their rivalries.  This continued 
during the Cold War.  Today, however, with the West disengaging the 
nineteenth-century model has returned, spearheaded by aid agencies, trans-
nationals and multilateral lending institutions.  Though this epochal shift has 
hardly been noticed in the US and Europe it is wreaking havoc in Africa, 
particularly Southern Africa, where most nations attained independence 
during the late 1980s and early 1990s. (3) 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Wright, GW 1989. US foreign policy and destabilization in Southern Africa. Washington D.C.: 159-168. [Online]. Available: 
www.roape.org [02/04/2004] 
 
3. Beinart, P 1995. Out of Africa: 12/26/94 and back to the 1980s: [Online]. Available: www.hartford-hwp.com [02/04/2004   
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As per the foregoing conjecture, the last decade of the 20th century saw the 
attainment of independence in most Southern African nations.  Namibia got 
its independence in March 1990, followed by the first democratic elections 
in September 1992, in Angola and South Africa in 1994. 
   
1.1 Objectives of the research 
It is this study’s objective to examine the fundamental characteristics of the 
US policy objectives in the region.  The broad and specific objectives of the 
study is to examine and contrast the parallel foreign policy aims of 
successive US administrations under Nixon, Carter and Reagan; locate the 
study in its proper historical context; investigate the reasons why the 
question of granting independence to Namibia was delayed for more than a 
decade and to determine the roles of the Soviet-Cuban involvement in the 
region.  The aims of the study are the reflection of the research-hypothesis 
including the statement of the problem being researched.  Much so, they 
lend much focus to the research through the identification of measurable 
variables.  In other words, the primary hypothesis in this study is to seek an 
understanding on the roles played by outside forces in shaping the political 
landscape in the sub-region, especially subsequent to the attainment of 
independence in Angola. 
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1.2 Background of the research 
Gervasi observes that the then Cold War added a new dimension to every 
square inch of the universe’s surface. (4) Nyerere contends that the political 
direction embarked upon by nationalist movements in Southern Africa did 
not necessarily represent an outburst of oppositional frenzy in which 
alternatives came to mean reactionary.  Instead, the struggles for national 
independence and self-determination were driven by the mere believe that 
colonialism and apartheid oppression in any form were unjust and in 
contradiction with the basic tenets and values of modern democracy. (5)  As it 
appeared then, the US policy objectives were at times rudder-less, inept and 
at best misplaced.  Power-sharing arrangements as advocated by the US 
were mostly aimed at the creation of an African bourgeoisie who were 
mainly interested in replacing the colonial masters within the state apparatus.  
Suffice to say, the principal objective of the Washington-Pretoria alliance 
was to reshape the politics in the region in their interests.  On the contrary 
the workers’ interests were mainly embedded in genuine social 
transformation. 
 
1.3 The research design 
The research methodology of this study includes elements from perspectives 
of discourse analysis and ideology critique, which presupposes the use of  
primary and secondary data collection tools, to either disapprove or prove 
the assumptions underlying the research problem.  In other words, a 
_________________________________ 
4. Gervasi, S 1976. Rationale for lunacy. Vol. 22. Issue 222 [Online]. Available: http://web32.epinet.com.citation.asp?tb 
[25/10/2005] 
 
5. Nyerere, JK 1986. America and South Africa. (Special Issue). Julius K. Nyerere was President of the United Republic of 
Tanzania and inspired and harboured most of the current post-Cold War leaders in many States in the sub-region. UWC e-
Journals. 
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process that goes beyond diagnosis into prognosis, where problems are 
found and interpreted and alternatives suggested.  In this connection it is 
suggested that US foreign policy toward Southern Africa had been very 
confusing and contradictory.  Strategies formulated to deal with turbulence 
in the Third World have followed no fixed pattern.  Trial and error have 
produced a wide array of inconsistent policies, revealing flawed strategies.  
Suffice to say, the US policies were predominantly shaped by an alarming 
perception of an increasingly aggressive Soviet Union.  As the Cold War 
came to an end we became increasingly aware of the extent to which the 
lens of anti-Sovietism distorted the US post-war polices toward Southern 
Africa, especially when considering the delayed settlement of the Namibian 
question.  Namibia, in the classical sense of the word was considered the 
last remaining colony on the continent.  Because of its allegiance to the 
former Soviet Union the US used the settlement of the Namibian question 
as a political tool to checkmate Soviet expansionism.   The methodological 
strategies employed in this study are of a qualitative nature, which includes 
literature review, secondary analysis and qualitative research as a means to 
facilitate the depth and width of the study and the database.  Useful 
information was acquired from various textbooks, journals and existing 
literature on the subject matter under investigation as these filled the need 
for specific reference or citation. 
 
1.4 Structure of the research 
Structurally, the thesis is divided into five broad chapters.  Chapter Two 
introduces the main policy tenets of successive US administrations under 
Nixon, Carter and Reagan.  It also highlights the significant shifts and 
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responses of the Nixon administrations’ policy of “constructive co-
operation” within the context of the then Cold War.  It further deals with the 
Carter policies of “enticement” aimed at winning over friends in the sub-
region to safeguard Western interests.  It further analyses the Reagan 
revolution, which is a natural outflow of the policy tones set by the Nixon-
Carter administrations aimed at containing Soviet expansionism.  Chapter 
three is based on a case study of the process leading to the armed struggle 
and the subsequent negotiations leading to Namibia’s independence.  It also 
highlights the numerous efforts made at delaying the implementation of the 
UNSC resolution 435 of 1978.  Chapter four is dedicated to the roles of the 
Soviet-Cuban involvement in the sub-region and examines and contrast 
Cuba’s pre- and post-1959 foreign policy.  In this connection, further details 
are explored and answers sought in terms of the US responses subsequent to 
President Fidel Castro Ruz’s epoch-making speech in 1961.  This is outlined 
against the background of Cuba’s alliances with nationalist movements in 
the sub-region.  Substantial details are also covered regarding the political 
and military situation in Angola following the granting of independence to 
Namibia. 
 
1.5 Significance of the research 
The research is significant in that it seeks to test, affirm or disapprove 
particular distinct perceptions and policy responses of successive US 
administrations.  It highlights the disabilities of such and at the same time 
suggests that bi-partisan policies could have achieved the very policy 
objectives of the US namely, freedom, equality and justice.  In addition, the 
study draws on comparative historical evidence and analysis, thereby 
contrasting and contending that the US policy formulation and responses 
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were unfortunate, uninformed and at best contradictory to the very same 
ideals it sought to achieve.  Lewis corroborates this assumption in observing 
that over the decades, strategies formulated to deal with turbulence in the 
Third World have followed no fixed pattern.  Trial and error have produced 
a wide array of inconsistent policies, revealing flawed strategies, especially 
during the Nixon, Carter and Reagan presidencies. (6) 
 
1.6 Limitations of the research      
The author of this study is very much familiar with subject matter as he has 
done some work on this topic already.  In addition, his current profession as 
a diplomat may add to suggestions of an approach with fixed perceptions.  
This may further arouse suspicions of perceived resistance against “western 
views”. Another limitation of the study is extent of its focus on the 
Africanist approach, because of the author’s believes that “outsiders” 
deliberately distorted Africa’s political history.  The problem of 
thoroughness may reveal itself at several levels because of a lack of constant 
consultation and guidance. Oral information may also not be objective as 
this is suspected to be limited to fixed perceptions. Therefore, the contents of 
the research work and its conclusions should be seen in relation to the 
aforementioned limitations. 
____________________________________ 
6. Lewis, WH 1986. United States responses to inter-Africa regional problems and prospects: Foreign policy in a turbulent age. In 
Skinner, EP (ed) Beyond constructive engagement: United States foreign policy toward Africa, 88-89. New York: Paragon House 
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1.7 Conclusion 
The struggles for national liberation and self-determination reached a climax 
as the 1970s drew to a close, especially after granting of independence by 
Portugal to all its former colonies in region.  This momentous occurrence 
added more momentum which saw the emergence and development of a new 
culture of the political struggles in the sub-region with an important 
component to that, this being the taking up of arms. 
 
These struggles must be viewed against the background of the then Cold 
War.  Of particular importance is the manner in which the US foreign policy 
evolved and impacted on the region.  The interventionist posture adopted by 
the US since 1945 which came to find prominence during the Reagan-Bush 
revolution were deliberate attempts aimed at reshaping the politics in the 
region in the US favour.  The policy pursued by President Reagan was 
congruent with its assumed role as an imperial state exercising global 
hegemony. (7) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
___________________________________ 
 
7 Wright, GW 1989. US foreign policy and destabilization in Southern Africa. Washington D.C.: Vol. 16. No. 45/46. [Online]. 
Available: http://www.roape.org/cgi-bin/roape/show4517.html [18/09/2004] 
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2. THE UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS 
SOUTHERN AFRICA 
 
 
2.1      Introduction 
 
Most Southern African nations during the 1970’s and beyond, in one way or 
the other had been plagued by “imposed civil conflagration”.  This is termed 
so, because the superpowers had a hand in it.  The objective it is assumed 
was to establish spheres of influence, or to create reliable allies at the 
periphery with the US as the undisputed centre of the core states. (8)   This 
chapter aims to sketch the flaws of the UN foreign policy in Southern 
Africa, with specific reference to Angola where the Cold War was plying 
itself out. It will compare the foreign policies of successive US 
administrations, indicating continuity and change between the Nixon and 
Carter Presidencies and the Reagan-Bush Presidencies.  President Nixon 
adopted a moderate policy of broadening ties with both the region’s white- 
and black-ruled states, whereas Carter’s approach to the region and language 
in which he framed it, took a more confrontational turn.  The Reagan-Bush 
era saw the development of a new constructive engagement approach which 
rested on three pillars, 1) Namibian independence, 2) prevent the growth and 
eliminate Soviet expansionism and 3) allow South Africa to become part of  
the global security network of Western nations as a legitimate ally (9) 
 
2.2     The Nixon and Carter Presidencies 
As pointed out in the introductory part of this chapter, the Nixon  
_______________________________ 
 
8. Dominiquez, J, Hernandez, R 1989. The United States-Cuba relations in the 1990s. San Francisco: West View Press. 11-14 
9. Lulat, Y G-M 1991. US relations with South Africa: An annotated bibliography. San Francisco: Western press. 7 
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administration found it convenient enough to believe that “there was little, or 
no Soviet involvement” in the sub-region. 
 
This perception, however, took the US policy architects by surprise as the 
1980s drew closer.  With the granting of independence by Portugal to its 
former colonies, particularly Angola, the US assumption that “there was 
little, or no Soviet involvement” in the region was taken aback. (10) 
 
We find that as independence for Angola became an imminent factor, a 
tripartite war escalated into an unprecedented regional conflict.  This conflict 
involved the US, Zaire and South Africa, supporting UNITA and the FNLA 
on the one side.  The Soviet-Cuban alliance supported the MPLA on the 
other side.  This conflict lasted for almost three decades, causing tremendous 
destruction of property and life, second only to the Rwanda genocide, 
modern history has ever witnessed in the sub-continent. (11)  The US 
architects had to revisit the drawing boards to reassess their policy objectives 
and strategies (12) 
 
As these developments took place, we came to witness the determined 
involvement of the US in the region.  President Gerald Ford during 1975, 
extended “limited” covert support to Holden Alvaro Roberto’s FNLA.  On 
The other hand, the Soviet-Cuban alliance did likewise by providing both 
covert and overt support to the MPLA. (13) 
____________________________________________ 
11. Dominiquez, J, Hernandez, R 1989. The United States-Cuba relations in the 1990s. San Francisco: West View Press. 14 
12. Afonso, EI 2004. Verbal Communication. Ministry of External Relations. Angola: 10 November 
13. Dominiquez, J, Hernandez, R 1989. The United States-Cuba relations in the 1990s. San Francisco: West View Press. 12 
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The US Department of State under Henry Kissinger by 17 November 1975, 
as a counter-measure availed US$ 30 million in cash and arms to UNITA 
and the FNLA.  With the Portuguese ceding control of Luanda, Angola was 
left firmly in the control of the MPLA, which immediately sparked-off a 
bloody civil war.  Now we came to witness the complete involvement of the 
superpowers in the region.  Military and financial aid were complemented 
by the introduction of troops, first from the then Zaire and later from Cuba 
and South Africa.  At this point in time, war appeared to be the desired 
option, aimed at breaking the low-intensive military deadlock.  The US 
administration in a tactical foreign policy manoeuvre, by December 1975, 
through the enactment of the Clark Amendment Act temporarily suspended 
the CIA’s operations in Angola.  This in turn, gave the MPLA government 
some breather space, which was further bolstered by the introduction of 36 
000 Cuban troops. (14) 
 
Apartheid South Africa, a strategic ally of Washington was left on its own 
with UNITA and the FNLA in conflict with each other.  The South African 
regime, subsequent to a powerful strike by the combined FAPLA and Cuban 
forces, followed suit in the footsteps of the US.  It temporarily withdrew its 
forces from Angolan territory.  A war previously confined to northern and 
central Angola, now shifted to southern Angola and northern Namibia.  
Haunted by the idea of that happened in Angola could easily spill over into 
Namibia, South Africa escalated its militarization of northern Namibia. 
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The objective was to combat the activities of PLAN within Namibia.  This is 
testimony of the immense size of the SADF, and the billions of rand pumped 
into its maintenance and development.  Support for UNITA was considered  
strategically advantageous as it could also be used to contain Communist 
advances in the region. This at the same time led to greater co-operation and 
co-ordination of the military activities of UNITA and the SADF.  The SADF 
now assumed the principal role of availing huge amounts of military and 
financial assistance to UNITA. (15) 
 
With the Angolan administration firmly under the control of the MPLA and 
compounded by the manifestation of a considerable Soviet-Cuban 
involvement in the region, the US foreign policymakers, once again 
reassessed Washington’s policies.  These newly overhauled policies became 
operative in the early periods of 1976.  The Angola experience must have 
taught Washington some important lessons.  The lessons learned appeared to 
be the development of a strategy aimed at winning broad-based support for 
its policies.  As these security and foreign policy cracks became all the more 
apparent, pre-emptive diplomacy appeared to be the desired strategy option.  
It must be remembered that this strategy was enunciated against the 
background that Congress might shoot down any strategy that involved the 
US military.  These new strategy objectives were formally tabled on 27 
April 1976, in Lusaka, Zambia. (16) 
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Kissinger, at the Lusaka Conference, enunciated a set of policies aimed at 
achieving a settlement in the then Rhodesia.  Lewis observed that the 
Rhodesia regime, of course was hard-pressed by the prowess of the Mugabe-
Nkomo led liberation forces and therefore the urgency. (17)  In addition, a 
formula for an internationally supervised and recognized transition to 
independence in Namibia was hammered out, including a peaceful end to 
apartheid in South Africa.  These were tactical moves aimed at hastening 
and managing the political changes that were taking place in the sub-region.  
They were also aimed at ending violence, thereby reducing the appeal and 
influence of the radicals.  Simultaneously, they also had the objective of 
scaling down any persistent Soviet-Cuban influence in the region. (18) 
 
South Africa, a geo-strategic ally in containing Soviet advances in the region 
was prioritized rather than the then-Rhodesia to set the Lusaka Conference 
objectives in motion.  These strategies it is argued were to work like a 
double-edged sword.  First, the possibility of a quick settlement in the then-
Rhodesia was evident, given the military pressures exerted by the Mugabe-
Nkomo led liberation movements.  Secondly, they could also be employed 
as an effective mechanism to keep in-check Soviet-Cuban interventions.  
Thus Washington and Pretoria strategise the concept of a joint action to get 
negotiations on track in the then-Rhodesia.  A similar approach would then 
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be adopted in respect of Namibia and South Africa. (19) 
 
By mid-1976, after concerted consultations with apartheid Pretoria, Britain, 
the Frontline States and the US, Kissinger, launched a new diplomatic 
initiative.  This encapsulated efforts aimed at convincing Ian Smith to 
concede to majority rule at a Conference sponsored by the British in Geneva, 
which later led to the Lancaster House negotiations. (20)   Lewis contends that 
Kissinger was determined that bold new initiatives were required to stem the 
tide of instability and what he perceived to be a mounting challenge to US 
influence in Southern Africa.  Besides, Kissinger at this critical juncture was 
going through a balancing phase induced by the collapse of his détente 
strategy toward the Soviet Union; the spectre of Euro-communism in Spain, 
Portugal and Italy; and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. (21) 
 
By 1977, with the Oval Office changing hands, a total foreign policy 
overhaul was undertaken.  This marked the inception of the Carter 
administration, viewed as singular in terms of US relations with Africa.  The 
Carter presidency heralded a political emphasis on human rights, with a 
preferred approach on emphasizing diplomacy to resolve disputes, as well as 
to accommodate US interests. (22)   The Carter administration was bent on 
offsetting past negative impressions of US neglect, emphasizing a stronger 
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commitment to social justice and economic development, greater respect for 
African nationalism, support for legitimate African defence needs etcetera.  
This indeed, in the initial stages put the US on a direct collusion course with 
apartheid South Africa.  During this period, issues pertaining to the UNSC 
declaration on the granting of independence to colonial peoples became 
more prominent.  As such, the resolution of the Namibian question once 
more resurfaced.  Geo-politics (for the time being) was pushed to the 
margins.  This strategy, the argument is advanced was used to explain the 
US interests in the sub-region.  It worked, but stalemated in the long run, 
particularly when considering the protracted process of granting 
independence to Zimbabwe and Namibia. (23) 
 
With these policy shifts and changes, albeit parallel to customary imperialist 
US objectives, the argument is that a strategy to settle all pending conflicts 
in the region was the most desired objective.  As a step aimed at achieving 
this goal, Vice-President Mondale met with Prime Minister B. J. Vorster, to 
inform him about Washington’s new approach in the region.  During this 
encounter, the US Vice-President stated that: 
 “We see all three issues (Rhodesia, South Africa and Namibia) as 
being of basic importance. We don’t think that progress on one issue 
excuses no progress on the other issue.  But any progress of 
significance will be appreciated, will be valuable and will have to be 
recognized” (24) 
 
It is this study’s submission that such high-sounding rhetoric had been the 
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hallmark of successive US administrations.  These were used to callously 
manipulate, marginalize and undermine genuine African priorities.  
Nonetheless, such unprecedented policy changes caught apartheid South 
Africa off-guard.  It must be remembered that this happened at a time when 
South Africa had been under tremendous internal and external pressures and 
criticism because of its invasion of Angola and the 1976 massacre of 
students in Soweto. (25)   Estimates are that from March 1976, when South 
Africa withdrew its troops from Angola to June 1979, it conducted 
altogether 386 military operations against that country.  It goes without 
saying that South Africa had no alternative, but to review its regional 
policies if it was to maintain any international credibility (26) 
 
It also appeared that there were in fact determined efforts  at work in as far 
as Washington was concerned to settle the raging conflicts in the region.  
However, diplomatic efforts aimed at pushing for negotiated settlements 
between the two strategic allies differed significantly.  For instance, the then 
Rhodesia issue was handled by the State Department of Washington in close 
consultation with its British counterpart.  Nonetheless, it was only after three 
years of protracted on-and-then-off talks that a settlement could be 
produced.  It must be remembered that Washington was not directly 
involved in the final rounds of negotiating a settlement for the then-
Rhodesia.  In any event, the Carter administration should be credited for its 
diplomatic efforts and most importantly, its refusal to bow to pressures  
_______________________________ 
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Congress to lift sanctions, which would have otherwise reduced pressure on 
the Smith regime to concede to majority rule. (27) 
 
As far as the Namibian question was concerned, we found that the US 
delegation to the UNSC, although half-heartedly, shaped the way to also 
have this matter resolved.  As already pointed out in the foregoing section 
of this thesis, the Carter administration was determined at off-setting past 
impressions of US neglect as evidenced during the Nixon era.  South Africa 
and Namibia became a litmus test for this administration.  As such the 
Carter administration shifted towards a confrontationist posture with 
apartheid South Africa. (28)  It took the lead in organizing the Western Five 
Contact Group.  Comprising the US, Canada, France, Germany and the UK, 
the Group unveiled proposals for the settlement of the Namibian question 
namely, resolution 435 of 1978.  Suffice to say, these countries were and 
remain the largest investors in the Namibian mining industry, so they hardly 
constituted an impartial broker.  In other words, they acted as both a player 
and referee to ensure the best possible post-colonial settlement for big 
business.  In this connection, South Africa having agreed to, and accepted 
this peace formula on the long run attempted to frustrate its implementation 
in many ways.  It also emerged that the same peace plan was compromised 
as the Washington administrations changed hands, especially during the 
Reagan era. (29) 
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The study submits that the Carter administration in stark contrast to its 
predecessor, indeed succeeded in laying the foundation for further 
consultation on the matter.  However, the process of concluding the same 
peace formula took a nose-dive with the assumption of power by President 
Ronald Reagan in 1981.  This period also know as the start of the Reagan 
revolution saw a dramatic u-turn from US foreign policy that committed 
itself to social justice and economic development in Africa; to resolve 
African disputes peacefully; to show greater respect for African nationalism; 
support for legitimate African defence needs and to show greater respect for 
human rights, which strengthens the fabric of African nations as articulated 
by Cyrus Vance at the 58th Annual Meeting of the US Jaycees on 20 June 
1978. (30) 
 
2.3 The Reagan-Bush Revolution 
With President Ronald Reagan at the helm of the Oval Office, we came to 
witness an abrupt, if not a complete reversal of his predecessor’s policies.  
President Reagan brought into his administration foreign policy officers that 
were totally hostile to the Carter administration’s policies.  It goes without 
saying that President Reagan was not that knowledgeable in as far as foreign 
policy matters were concerned.  Much policy decisions that emerged during 
the infant stages of his first term of office reflected the views of his chief  
scholarly policy advisers, who saw the world through magnifying lenses of 
geopolitical considerations  (31) 
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In the Southern Africa region all those nations perceived to be Marxist 
adherents were now seen as threatening Western interests.  President 
Reagan’s anti-Soviet rhetoric indeed reflected his innate desire to depart 
from containment and embark on a much sterner course in world politics.  
Underlying these policy strands, marked by its multi-faceted scope of 
intentions and shifts was the then East-West rivalry, which peaked at that 
point in time.  The Reagan doctrine was premised on the assumption that 
direct military, political and economic pressure on perceived Communist 
governments, would strain the Soviet Union’s military and economic 
systems to a point where they could not compete.  The objective was to 
checkmate Soviet expansionism.  In the America’s, mindful of its support 
for nationalist movements in Africa and Central America, President Castro’s 
Cuba was identified as such.  The strategy enacted was the further tightening 
of the economic embargo initially imposed during the Kennedy era. (32) 
 
The reversal of Washington’s foreign policy towards the Third World, this 
study argues, strongly influenced its policy premises with regard to Southern 
Africa.  Dr. Chester Crocker, the then Assistant Secretary of State for 
African Affairs and a former professor at Georgetown University was 
enlisted to set these policy objectives in motion.  Geopolitical considerations 
thus resurfaced over human rights and peaceful co-existence.  These, 
including the introduction of corporate capital as a major element in the 
strategy of Western imperialism, could be held directly responsible for the 
delay in settling the Namibian question for more than  
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two decades. Corporate capital could easily get under the defences of 
admittedly weak and newly independent states. (33)  According to Allen, since 
the late 1970s the US had secured its economic interests more through 
international financial institutions and international trade regimes, such as 
the WTO. (34) 
 
As we came to witness these dramatic changes in Washington's foreign 
policy, so was the likelihood of a more accommodative approach toward 
apartheid South Africa.  This in fact is testimony of a major televised 
interview in March 1981, in which President Ronald Reagan described the 
South African regime: 
 “As a friendly country, a country that strategically is essential to the 
 free world in its production of minerals that we must all have” (35) 
 
In this connection, it should be noted that the US economic interests in the 
sub-region were heavily concentrated.  The US economic interest at that 
point in time totalled a massive US$ 6 billion.  More so, this region contains 
immense deposits of strategic minerals that were of vital importance to the 
US industrial economy.  The region furthermore has a major share of the 
world’s diamonds, uranium and gold output.  In addition, the US had an 
important objective in protecting its strategic and military interests in the 
region.  More important, the Cape sea route was of strategic importance as 
most of the crude oil destined for the West was shipped via this route.  The 
most important aspect vis-à-vis the US foreign policy toward 
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the sub-region, were purely economic and strategic.  These were the 
considerations that took prominence over the US human rights credentials. 
(36) 
 
Important to note in relation to the above observation is Dr. Crocker’s 
Memorandum to the then Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, in May 1981, 
in which he stated that: 
“the political relationship between the US and South Africa has now 
arrived at the crossroads of perhaps historical significance.  After 
twenty years of generally US coolness towards South Africa and the 
concomitant intransigence, the possibility may exist for a more 
positive and reciprocal relationship between the two countries based 
on shared strategic concerns in Southern Africa, our recognition of P. 
W. Botha represents an unique opportunity for domestic change and 
the willingness of the Reagan administration to deal realistically with 
South Africa.  The problem of Namibia, however, which complicates 
our relationship with our European allies and Black Africa, is a 
primary obstacle to the development of new relationships with South 
Africa.  It also represents an opportunity to counter the Soviet threat 
in Africa.  We thus need Pretoria’s co-operation in working towards 
an internationally acceptable solution to Namibia which would, 
however, safeguard the US and South Africa’s essential interests and 
concerns”. (37) 
 
On the margins of this Memorandum, Bush cites the development of the 
global interstate system, initially conceived between 1945 and 1967.  The 
US is placed at the centre as the undisputed advocate of that system, which 
led to the emergence of a number of states that took up intermediary 
positions between the core represented by the US and its European allies and 
the periphery represented by poorer nations in Africa and the Third World at 
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large.  Bush further observed that these intermediate states possessed 
characteristics of the core states in terms of their relationship with the 
periphery, but at the same time also share characteristics of the periphery in 
terms of their relationship with the core.  Therefore, the relationship that was 
coined by Crocker and existed between the US and South Africa must be 
seen in this context.  Suffice to say, South Africa was not only a source of 
cheap and economically important minerals for the US industrial economy, 
but it also provided a means for corporate capital to use it as staging point 
for its penetration of the sub-region. (38) 
 
This Memorandum, the study further wishes to submit, presents a dramatic 
shift in the policy objectives of this particular administration from that of its 
predecessors.  It should be noted, that President Reagan, perhaps more than 
any other president of the US, harboured the thought, that his predecessors 
had been too idle in the battle against Soviet expansionism.  Therefore, those 
ingrained policies of containment had to be superseded, and supplanted by a 
more decisive and aggressive approach.  What was now at issue was the 
determined safeguarding of the US economic and security interests, 
especially in Angola and Namibia and, to a greater extent South Africa.  
This is a clear manifestation that the tremendous loss of life and destruction 
of property in these countries did little to appeal to the moral conscience of 
US policy makers.  Even so, it did little to appeal for a quicker resolution of 
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the conflicts in the region.  Nevertheless, the Reagan administration seemed 
determined to push forward diplomatic efforts, aimed at settling the 
Namibian question.  But, we should not be oblivious of the fact that this did 
not came about without major compromises and concessions. (39) 
 
 
Hence, this thesis’ submission again, that it was indeed Dr. Crocker’s 
diplomatic initiatives that heralded the urgency of a settlement of the 
Namibian issue.  This had to be done, taking into account the US core 
concerns that the Sovietization of the Third World had to be reversed.  It was 
precisely at this moment, that the Reagan administration conceived the 
policy of “constructive engagement”, linking independence in Namibia to 
the Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola.  This policy of linkage, Dr. 
Crocker believed would entice apartheid South Africa to concede to the 
implementation of the UNSC resolution 435 of 1978.  Dr. Chester Crocker 
never believed that South Africa could be pressurized into an agreement 
solely on implementing the peace formula for Namibia. Moreover, he was 
convinced that it could be enticed on this issue, mindful of its own particular 
concerns, thus the linkage strategy could serve both these ends. (40) 
  
On the contrary, according to O’Neil and Munslow the linkage policy indeed 
aided Pretoria with more time and space to step up its aggression against 
neighbouring states.  This in turn resulted in South Africa curtailing 
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black political rights, thereby tightening the noose on indigenous 
populations by expanding its Bantustan policies. (41)    Azicri observes that 
instead of the linkage policy the US should have abandoned it in its entirety.  
It should rather have taken a firmer stand with South Africa, including the 
threat of withdrawing all military, political and economic assistance.  
Furthermore, the US could also have disengaged itself from bilateral ties 
with South Africa.  Suffice to say, which could have culminated in the 
suspension of training its coast guards, as well as the suspension of its 
Honorary Consuls in New York and Washington.  In addition, it could also 
have re-imposed export controls on items destined for apartheid South 
Africa’s military and police machinery. (42) 
 
For Washington, the linkage strategy indeed served its desired objectives, 
especially on the withdrawal of the Cuban troops from Angola. Moreover, it 
should be remembered that Cuba had always been at loggerheads with the 
US, because of its support for revolutionary movements in Central America 
and Southern Africa, especially the Great Lakes region.  Thus the 
withdrawal of the Cuban troops from Angolan territory would translate in a 
reversal of Cuba’s political and diplomatic successes of the late 1960s and 
early 1970s. (43) 
 
O’Neil and Munslow, further observed that the policy of constructive 
engagement was particularly developed for Southern Africa with the 
objective to encourage managed change in South Africa through dialogue 
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rather than economic pressure.  It must be remembered that the US at this 
time in point was under tremendous pressure to impose comprehensive 
economic sanctions on South Africa.  It however, constantly shielded South 
Africa from becoming the target of such sanctions and other punitive 
measures.  The bottom-line however, of this policy of “constructive 
engagement” was to keep South Africa as a regional ally to combat Soviet 
and Cuban influence in the region. (44)   
 
Soviet-Cuban involvement in Southern Africa became a major obstacle to 
the US foreign and security policy makers.  The Soviet-Cuban intervention 
in the region blocked the execution of the US policy objectives, aimed at 
winning over those sympathetic to its interests.  Once President Reagan 
assumed office, new strategies were adopted to solve conflicting interests by 
peaceful means, but not without strings appended thereto. This strategy is 
identified as the US low intensive conflict resolution strategy.  The 
enunciation of such a strategy would then require the selling of the US 
economic power, as it became evidently clear that the war was too costly 
and damaging to it is interests. (45) 
 
This strategy was set rolling in early 1981 subsequent to an article that 
appeared in the US Foreign Policy magazine by the summer  of 1979.  In 
this magazine, it is stated that: 
 “the multinational corporations can be the secret weapons of Western 
countries in Africa”. (46) 
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Here the perspective is based on the assumption, that greater activity on the 
part of the US was needed that could fit into the concept of the then Cold 
War.  US economic power could be used, not only to checkmate Communist 
expansionism, but also to sell the successes of capitalism.  Thus, the 
reintroduction of corporate capitalism became a major element in the 
strategy of imperialism and neo-colonialism.  Undeniably, this conservative 
strategy was operationalized knowing that there was no Soviet equivalent to 
match it.  Soviet military aid could only be accompanied by small amounts 
of financial aid, which were loans rather than grants.  It could not match 
with parastatal investments on the scale of Western MNCs. (47) 
 
Turok argues that powerful multinationals by-passed governments.  They 
virtually ignored the existence of political independence and continued to 
operate in the same fashion as during colonialism.  They processed raw 
materials and semi-manufactured goods by means of a transfer-pricing 
system from one to another.  In this manner, they exploited the different 
taxation systems, levels of wage labour and the different levels of 
production.  In the final analysis, this mitigated against the interests and 
militated against the emergence of a coherent indigenously rooted and 
integrated economic development.  This study wishes to submit that the US 
indeed attempted in turning the sub-region into a geo-strategic real estate. In 
any event it is corporate capital that shapes the strategic considerations of 
states.  Value was now defined in terms of US access to cheap labour, raw  
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materials, military bases and the like.  Trans-nationalization, or more 
precisely, globalization of the world economy became a major contemporary 
phenomenon. (48)  Bush and Szeftel rightly agrees that this was hardly 
surprising, given the traditional Western preoccupation with ensuring  its 
own access to and control over raw materials, particularly for the US as its 
dependence on imported minerals increased. (49) 
 
Turok further contends that in as far as the US was concerned, the effective 
and successful execution of such a strategy should have as its principle: 
- a criteria to grant assistance to African countries that should be based 
on past and present attitudes of any African government with regard 
to issues that directly concern the United States, particularly these 
governments’ position in respect of foreign investment and 
nationalization, 
- the evaluation of these governments’ real and potential contributions 
towards regional and international peace and stability, 
- the possibility of that government to be in power, taking into 
consideration the problems it has to face, 
- the qualities of such a State, rather than government, particularly with 
regard to its size, resources and location in relation to important areas 
of conflict and transportation routes, and finally, 
- multinationals when perceived as qualifying to be a powerful 
instrument of the United States’ interests in the sub-region, be backed 
together with its already established allies in Africa, and for that 
matter, if need be alone. (50) 
 
According to some development theorists, these policy premises of the US, 
only sought to prevent the Cuban troops based in Angola from crossing the  
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Cunene and the Orange Rivers.  It at the same time prevented the South 
African troops from remaining in the Zambezi and the Cunene areas.  Thus, 
the active participation of trans-national corporations, backed by the highest 
levels of government was urgently needed.  On the other hand, material 
resources needed to carry out these strategic objectives, would be obtained  
by strengthening US interests in the sub-region.  If need be, assistance 
programs for development should be duplicated.  It must be noted, that at 
that moment, the then-Rhodesia was about to become Zimbabwe, following 
the Lancaster House negotiations.  The outcome of the Lancaster House 
talks, ironically, effectively blocked US initial policies, at least in so far as 
Zimbabwe was concerned.  What remained then was the issue of Namibia, 
which indeed demanded an immediate solution to the region’s conflicts. (51) 
 
There had been a longstanding common consensus between the US and 
Western Europe, to co-operate in defending their common interests in 
relation to perceived Communist threats.  The tendency that prevailed then 
was to take drastic steps, if necessary, to curtail Communism.  This once 
again, brought to surface the re-enunciation of the “constructive 
engagement” theory, as advocated by the Anglo-American alliance of the 
Reagan-Thatcher team.  The “constructive engagement” doctrine had two 
primary objectives, as per the 1981 statement of Dr. Chester Crocker, then 
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, in which he remarked: 
“we have lost an important influence over South Africa due to our 
lack of perception towards the dynamic changes in South Africa.   
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Sometimes, it was a mistake to believe that the watches of South 
Africa and the United States are synchronized at the same hour.  It is 
evident that to stimulate South Africa to decide its own future would 
benefit the interests of the United States”. (52) 
 
 
Dr. Crocker here referred to the reform programs of President P.W. Botha, 
which were aimed at co-opting the internal nationalist wings in South 
Africa.  He failed to realize that US policies in the region and, in particular  
South Africa lacked the potential of influencing the pace of the desired 
political changes.  As a matter of fact, the US had long been considered as 
being too sympathetic towards apartheid South Africa. (53) 
 
Besides, the Botha administration suffered a number of set-backs, 
particularly the failure of both the “total strategy” and its successor; 
“winning hearts and minds” (WHAM).  These approaches involved offering 
token gestures of appeasement at home, such as injecting money into 
“betterment” schemes in black townships, while simultaneously cracking 
down on internal opposition.  These further included mounting aggression 
against neighbouring states with the objective of flushing out external 
opposition to apartheid. (54) 
 
In the final analysis, the course of events in South Africa, were set to 
determine the basic principles of the US foreign policy determinations.   
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Important to note in relation to this observation, was that the conservatives 
in the US and South Africa appeared to have coincidentally agreed in their 
intensions.  They intended to prevent vis-à-vis the South African reform 
process the creation of subjective conditions and the constellation of 
objective conditions that could lead to a revolutionary process.  It was such a 
situation that would in effect end white domination and the subsequent 
withdrawal from the international capitalist system.  The latter would 
subvert the processes underway in Mozambique and Angola. (55) 
 
Dr. Crocker realizing the apparent rejection of Pretoria’s disingenuous 
manoeuvres, set himself the task to re-assess US policies.  He aimed at 
pressurizing South Africa to accelerate the reform process.  This would 
encapsulate not to only recognize the interests of the dominant groups in 
South Africa, but also not to harm them.  White domination however, had to 
be preserved at all costs.  The Namibia question would be dealt with in 
finding an arrangement that would at best exclude the possibility of a 
SWAPO administration in Windhoek.  In this regard, the UNSC resolution 
435 of 1978, therefore would only serve as a means leading to 
independence, and not as the basis for a full agreement.  Angola then would 
be another factor – the withdrawal of the Cuban troops from that territory.  
In relation to this, it is this thesis’s submission that had the US at that 
moment succeeded in getting the Cubans out of Angola as a precondition, 
the prospects of independence for Namibia would in all likelihood have been 
more remote. (56) 
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Gonzalez argues that the issue of pre-conditioning Namibia’s independence 
to the Cuban troop withdrawal had been shameful. The linkage theory 
completely disregarded international law and the need for peace in Namibia. 
As a matter of fact, Angola was already a sovereign state.  Suffice to say, the 
linkage doctrine was purely designed, and geared towards the reduction, if 
not the elimination of the Soviet-Cuban presence in Southern Africa, 
especially in Angola with its huge oil reserves. (57)  
 
By late 1983, Alexander Haig, formulated a new political strategy, also 
known as the “Haig Doctrine” that would follow two paths and be 
complimentary at the same time; to establish a dialogue with regard to the 
Namibia issue and second, to also establish dialogue with Angola on the 
same issue for a concession on the Cuban troop withdrawal.  The Angolans 
agreed to the proposals, but only after guarantees for independence in 
Namibia was secured.  This, the argument is advanced, now shifted the 
emphasis from withdrawal, but to how it should be executed.  This 
manoeuvre by Alexander Haig alerted the members of the Western Contact 
Group.  The Western Contact Group, at that moment was convinced that the 
Angolans would not allow the Cuban troop withdrawal prior to Namibia’s 
independence.  They were fearful that the US insistence on this issue would 
endanger the entire process towards finding peace in the region.  Apart from 
this, there were also some suspicions and mistrust that the US was 
attempting to make inroads in the region, thereby portraying itself as the 
messiah of peace to the region.  There was exceptional scepticism regarding  
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the US motives, which at the same time was aimed at entrenching its own 
imperialist interests and agendas.  (58) 
 
Moreover, the US also came forward with a strategy that portrayed apartheid 
South Africa as part and parcel of the regional problem. It is argued that this 
was much more aimed at preventing neighbouring countries from breaking 
their economic dependence from South Africa.  As apartheid strategists then 
had it, South Africa had to take the leading role in the regional institution; 
the Constellation of Southern African States (CSAS), conceived by the 
regime led by P. W. Botha and endorsed by the US.  This was to be a 
development project aimed at further entrenching international capitalist 
interests.  Now, had such a doctrine succeeded, it would in all likelihood 
have placed the Botha regime in such a strategic position, where it could 
compromise the states in the region at will.  Pressure would then be brought 
to bear on these states to server their ties with the Eastern bloc countries.  
This in turn would have signalled a decisive defeat to Communist influence 
and advances in this strategic part of the African continent.  The Reagan era 
indeed appeared to have had a tremendous impact in dictating the course of 
political events in the world.  This is so, especially when considering the 
emerging disintegration of the Eastern Bloc.  This process was further 
propelled with the advent of Mikhail Gorbachev as Prime Minister of the 
Soviet Union in 1985.  But could this be equally said of the US domestic 
policies from which it derived its foreign and security policies? (59) 
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The US domestic economic crisis, which started long before President 
Ronald Reagan assumed office, was gaining momentum.  It was further 
worsened, because of President Reagan’s declared policies of war on drugs 
and taxes for the rich, which resulted in massive tax breaks for the rich and 
wealthy.  Moreover, the Reagan administration also initiated an enormous 
strategic military weapons programme, especially with a focus on 
Communist advances in Afghanistan.  The same programme was also aimed 
at deterring Communist advances in Central America and the Caribbean, 
particularly Cuba, the strategic and ardent ally of the Soviet Union in that 
region.  All these were to have a tremendous impact on the Federal 
government’s budget.  The increased deficit gap, resultant of President 
Reagan’s unchecked spending, this thesis submits, cost President George H. 
Bush a second term bid.  According to MacKay and Hill, the 1981-82 
economic recession of the US, was the worse ever since the Great 
Depression of the 1930s, which put up to 10% of Americans out of jobs.  
Although this recession subsided towards the end of 1982, a clear message 
was signalled to President Reagan’s successor - conservative spending if that 
trend of recovery was to be kept intact.  After all it is the electorate that 
decides a president’s future in the White House. (60) 
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The Reagan administration, convinced that the balance of military power 
had swung in favour of the Soviets, increased military spending, especially 
on nuclear arms projects.  It was the period of the great arms race, which 
saw the launching of the US Star Wars project, costing its tax-payers billions 
of dollars over the next decade.  President Reagan launched this project 
convinced that the Soviet military and political threats were becoming a 
reality.  He further believed that it was neither plausible nor possible to 
linger on as the US security interests were at stake.  President Reagan 
simultaneously expanded the US navy as a key to a resurgence of its power 
in the post-Vietnam era. (61)   
 
As March 1985 was drawing closer, we came to witness the assumption of 
office by Prime Minister Mikhail Gorbachev in the former Soviet Union.  
This unexpected advent of Gorbachev now became the global focus of the 
US foreign policy.  Mikhail Gorbachev, described by an ex-Soviet foreign 
Minister as “a man with a nice smile, but who’s got iron teeth”, ironically 
was more concerned with the Soviet Union’s domestic state of affairs.  
Gorbachev’s first priority therefore, was the Soviet Union’s economic 
reconstruction.  On the margins of this, it must be remembered, that 
Gorbachev had a good command of international affairs.  With his new 
reform policies, focused on the reconstruction of the Soviet Union’s 
economy still in its infancy stages, Gorbachev, after only a few months in 
office launched a diplomatic protest against President Reagan’s intensions to 
build a massive space shield.  Moreover, well-versed with the Euro- 
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American differences on defence matters, especially their inability to act as a 
unit to the conflicts in the Middle-East, Prime Minister Gorbachev set 
himself the task of exploiting those weaknesses. (62) 
 
According to O’Neil and Munslow, Gorbachev’s ascendancy to power 
marked a notable retreat from confrontation between the East and the West, 
which the US was unable, or rather slow to grasp.  Conflict between 
administration and Congress exemplifies the disarray of US policy towards 
Southern Africa.  Gorbachev, as early as March 1986, indicated that the 
Soviet Union was trying to help find solutions to the conflict in Angola as 
part of a wider policy decision by the ruling Communist  Party, to seek 
negotiated solutions to all regional conflicts.  Yet the US was bent on 
reasserting its power on the global periphery, thereby increasing the cost of 
confrontation as noted in the foregoing paragraph. (63) 
 
Meanwhile, as the problems at home surged ahead unabated, the Soviets 
came to find themselves in a rather difficult position in respect of 
international affairs. Thus an opening-up in the then Soviet Union became 
an imminent factor for the ruling elite.  Gorbachev in shaky command of the 
then Soviet Union and the man to be reckoned with, especially in steering 
the direction of international politics provided the opportunity for the 
realization of this new political philosophy.  Washington at that moment 
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did know what the next tactical move of the Soviets would be, rather chose 
to follow the course of events with keen interest. The identification of a 
presidential hopeful that could match the diplomatic skills of Gorbachev 
now became the most singular issue as President Reagan’s term of office 
was drawing to an end.  Thus, foreign policy matters came to dominate the 
1989 presidential campaign in the US.  The US electorate, having witnessed 
the first cracks in the emerging disintegration of the then Soviet Union, 
rallied firmly behind the Republican nominated candidate for the presidency, 
George H. Bush. (64) 
 
By 20 January 1989, George H. Bush, who also came to be known as “Mr. 
Read my Lips”, became the 41st President of the USA.  According to 
Franklin, the Bush era was a mere continuation of the Reagan revolution, 
characterized by deficit spending and government lending.  President Bush 
almost revived the 1981-82 recessions.  As far as Africa was concerned, the 
Bush administration claimed to be championing the continent’s needs with 
its conservative agenda.  Ironically, its foreign policy was mostly 
preoccupied with the Middle East and the war on terror.  We also came to 
witness the introduction of a foreign policy doctrine formulated during the 
Reagan era – the “new world order”. (65) 
 
According to Mokoena, like the Reagan administration, the Bush 
administration embraced “constructive engagement” as the core of US 
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foreign policy toward Southern Africa in general and South Africa in 
particular.  Nevertheless, it also sought to avoid controversy that had been a 
trademark of the Reagan revolution, by trying to accommodate the region’s 
realities.  Like Reagan, President Bush, while publicly expressing the US 
abhorrence of Pretoria’s apartheid policies, continuously shielded Pretoria, 
thereby giving it the benefit of the doubt.  The administration generally 
showed no urgency in pushing Pretoria to embrace democracy, thus fuelling 
African suspicion regarding the US genuine purposes and objectives.  This 
has been the marked failure of the Reagan doctrine of “constructive 
engagement”. As the Cold War recedes into history, the ways and extent to 
which the lens of anti-Sovietization distorted the US formulation of its post-
war policies became increasing exposed.   Rather than examining African 
affairs in terms of regional concerns with poverty, human rights and self-
determination, the US frequently adopted a narrow ideological view of the 
issues at stake – anti-Communism. (66)   
 
On the margins of this, the “new world order”, the argument is advanced, 
was particularly aimed at stalling the spread of Communism in Latin 
America and Africa.  On the heels of this policy formulation, came the 
invasion of Panama on 20 December 1989.  This was the biggest US 
military intervention then, since the disgraced Vietnam War, in which 
approximately 25 000 US service personnel lost their lives, or were either 
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unaccounted for.  In this connection, it should be noted that the ouster of 
General Noriega’s regime in Panama, became the focal point of the US 
policy makers during the closing months of President Reagan’s term of 
office. (67)  
 
General Noriega was captured towards the end of December 1989, and 
flown to the US, escorted by marines and officers of the DEA to stand trial 
on narcotics related-charges.  At this point in time, it appeared that 
Washington had a well orchestrated agenda in dealing with closely 
perceived Communist threats.  Thus, next on the Bush administration’s 
agenda, in respect of its anti-Sovietization policy objective was the ouster of 
the leftist Sandanista movement of General Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua. (68) 
  
As these military and political developments were taking place across the 
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, we at the same time came to witness the final 
stages of Soviet disintegration.  President Bush, subsequent to an aborted 
coup in the former Soviet Union, and the consequent resignation of Prime 
Minister Gorbachev, announced the fall of Communism.  This, President 
Bush declared, “was the triumph of capitalism over Communism as an 
alternative”.  To the contrary, it is the opinion of this thesis, that this indeed, 
was not the demise of Communism.  It was rather a pragmatic move to 
realize and adapt to the new realities of the world as perceived through a  
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prism of specific conditions typical of all corners of the world.  A further 
argument is that Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost and its impact indeed 
introduced a dramatic change in the situation. (69)  
 
This hypothesis is corroborated by O’Neil and Munslow, who observed that 
form the late 1980s, there has been strong evidence that the new school of 
thought as conceived by Gorbachev, recognized the need for Third World 
countries to pass through a capitalist development phase before arriving at 
socialism. (70)  Saul also appear to agree with such an assumption, referring 
to a pronouncement by the former Soviet deputy foreign minister, Anatoly 
Adamashin during the 1989 signing of the Angola peace accord.  Adamashin 
remarked: “I personally don’t think that they are going to build socialism in 
this part of the world”.   He further observed that the Soviets have never 
been entirely enthusiastic about socialist endeavours in Southern Africa, 
consigning them as being mere states of socialist orientation. (71) 
  
Given these observations, the question is what was the essence of these 
conditional changes in relation to the new school of thinking?  The 
discerning answer is, given the evolving relative strengths and inclinations 
of the world’s different systems it would be the triumph of liberalism and, 
not capitalism over communism, with the latter collapsing into three 
hypostases, these being:  an idea, a reality and a social movement.  Hence, 
the birth and the triumph of people-centred social democracies. (72) 
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Strictly speaking, and given the above scenario, the argument is that it is 
important to understand as to what was happening at that moment, by 
viewing the political evolutions then in retrospect.  A further argument is 
that renewal of the then-Soviet Union, given its past development strategies, 
signified the collapse of an authoritarian bureaucratic form of socialism.  
Therefore, State-imposed socialism matched against developments as 
exposed by Prime Minister Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost, was 
becoming something of the past.  At first glance, it might look like the 
demise of socialism itself, but at close scrutiny, it was just the opposite.  And 
this is evidenced in the resurgent socialist and social democratic 
governments the world over, including the EU, South Africa and Namibia.  
Thus, the conclusion, that socialism has just not yet run its course.  It has 
just emerged from an early development stage, which in the end would 
enable us to judge its development potentialities as it reaches its stages of 
maturity. (73) 
 
The most appropriate conclusion, in relation to the events that were 
unfolding then and, given the crisis of capitalism in the new millennium, 
would be a just assumption that a social movement has just emerged.  It has 
just begun to assert itself in its up-to-date forms for viable development, 
continuity and social transformation.  The ultimate objective of such a 
phenomenon would be the lessening of the development of dependency and  
further marginalization.  In the final analysis, socialist values are in no way 
distinct from those of liberal systems.  Besides, both systems are organically 
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connected by the notion of men’s freedom inherited from the epoch of 
enlightenment, and early bourgeois revolutions.  These common traits 
included in both systems, in fact makes reference to the degree to which 
mankind has subjected the forces of nature.  It makes reference to mankind’s 
abilities to disclose society’s creative capabilities, social dynamism and 
individual democracy, measured in terms of scope and depth.  It accentuates 
the involvement of society in the political process, instead of being swamped 
as mere objects and consumers, as is the case in profit-driven capitalist 
systems. (74) 
 
As 1991 drew to a close, the administration of President George H. Bush 
came to find itself engulfed in a domestic economic crisis. This crisis in 
many ways was similar to that of the former Soviet Union when Prime 
Minister Gorbachev took office.  The 1991-economic crisis in the US had a 
clear bearing on the increased rate of unemployment, the soaring value of 
the dollar against other major currencies, and an ever-widening trade deficit 
with Japan.  In addition, the US budget deficit stood at an astronomical US$ 
300 billion. (75)  
 
Meanwhile, the 1992 presidential elections were just around the corner and 
as a matter of fact the focus of the US administration was now more on 
domestic policy.  According to the Washington Bureau’s economic poll, 
most of the US citizenry, including the large trans-national corporations 
appeared to be ready for political sacrifices.  This in essence meant that  
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issues pertaining to foreign and security policy were now temporarily 
pushed to the margins.  It was only in Florida, Miami, traditionally a 
Republican stronghold amongst the Cuban-Americans that President Bush 
attempted to talk foreign policy.  President Bush in a desperate move aimed 
at retaining the Cuban-American support in this State, thereby boosting his 
re-election bid, signed into law the Cuban Democracy Act.  This Act, also 
dubbed the “Torricelli Bill”, further tightened the more than three decades 
old economic embargo against Cuba.  Nevertheless, exactly the opposite 
seemed to have weighed more than mere ideological in fighting with the 
Island’s Marxist Communist government of President Fidel Castro Ruz. (76) 
 
These sentiments were well reflected in opinion polls of most Cuban-
Americans, who accused the Reagan-Bush administrations of empty 
promises and sheer demagoguery over Cuba.  They cite real issues facing the 
US, such as the staggering unemployment figures.  The US employment rate 
at that moment stood at 17 million.  In addition, the economy was 
deteriorating at an unprecedented pace with the country’s national debt 
standing at approximately US$ 4 trillion.  It is estimated that between 30-40 
million Americans had no proper medical insurance, because of an abusive 
health-care system.  It must be remembered, that President Bush initially did 
not favour the CDA of 1992, drafted by the Florida-based Democrat Senator.  
When signing the Bill into law, President Bush stated that this was “for 
freedom to rise in Cuba, Fidel Castro must fall”.  On the margins of this,  
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what was at issue were the politics of change.  Presidential contender, 
William Bill Clinton, during the election campaign touched little, if any on 
foreign policy, as well.  His only foreign policy statement was a short 
remark on the CDA, stating, “I believe in it, and I will enforce it”.  After all, 
it was a Democrat sponsored and initiated bill. (77)  
 
President Clinton, as is customary in the US, only started to speak foreign 
policy after the 1992 presidential elections, reassuring US allies of the 
continuity of its foreign policies.  He at the same time, cautioned US 
adversaries, especially those in the Middle East.  President-elect Clinton, in 
addition appealed for continued co-operation with the US, in respect of 
foreign policy matters, noting that, “although the leadership of the White 
House would change with his assumption of power, America’s fundamental 
interests have not changed”. (78) 
 
Amid the Democrat’s election victory, which brought to an end twelve years 
of Republican rule, the future of the US foreign policy in relation to Third 
World countries largely depended on its domestic policy resolve. (79)  As a 
matter of fact, President Clinton in his first foreign policy speech at 
Georgetown University endorsed George H. Bush’s stewardship of US 
interests abroad.  In addition, he also commented the Bush administration’s 
decision to wage the Gulf War, including his belief that the US should 
remain engaged in the World.  In the final analysis, the US security, 
strategic, and economic interests have to be safeguarded at all costs. 
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Undoubtedly, the US foreign policy had always been marked by its multi-
faceted scope of objectives, shifts and images throughout the last two 
centuries.  The premise has always been the reversal of the balance of 
power, in favour of the US, to a point where the international community 
was no longer divided in two, albeit with different approaches. (80) 
  
The problem however, was that successive US administrations’ foreign and 
security policy institutions were not that well structured.  These inhibited the 
triggering down of command from top to bottom, thereby making 
intelligence sharing all the more cumbersome. (81) 
 
What one can read in this is that successive US administrations, if not all, 
never considered that external stakeholders needed to buy-in their policies 
for a common development agenda.  On face value it seems that there had 
been a conspicuous lack of draft guidelines and a lack of scenario setting.  
These could have assisted tremendously with the running of “what if” 
scenarios, to determine the scope of analysis for security and foreign policy 
reviews, for implementation. The US policies, on the contrary, for the last 
four decades, or so attracted more resistance rather than support. (82) 
 
Mindful of the above, the discerning conclusion, is that the US policy 
towards Southern Africa had been shaped by an alarming perception of an 
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increasingly aggressive Soviet Union.  Liberation movements in the region 
sought and received assistance from the Soviet Union in the absence of such 
support from the West. Hence, they came to be perceived as advancing 
Communist agendas (83)   Historically, nationalist movements could not be 
particular about the means through which they carry on the struggle for 
liberation; they had to take advantage of any opportunity that presents itself.  
They had to accept assistance from wherever they can get it. (84) 
 
The mere association of nationalist movements with the East did not 
preclude transplanting Communist models of governance.  France and the 
US were the main birthplaces of modern democracy nevertheless they 
followed different paths towards setting up democratic systems.  As such the 
US over-zealous policies of countering the Sovietization of the sub-region, 
thereby holding hostage vast populations to its global hegemonic aspirations 
in the name of international capital and its scramble for resources, had been 
completely unjustified and indifferent to aspirations of freedom and justice. 
(85)   
 
Skinner consolidates this view by stating that over the last three decades, 
strategies formulated to deal with turbulence in the Third World have 
followed no fixed pattern.  Trial and error have produced a wide array of 
inconsistent policies and errors, revealing flawed strategies.  Therefore, the 
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conclusion that the US foreign policy toward Southern Africa had been very 
confusing and contradictory and, at worst controversial, bias and hostile in 
as far as it related to African interest and aspirations for freedom, equality, 
justice and self-determination. (86)   If democracy, freedom and support for 
human rights are the main policy goals of the US, its unholy alliance and 
partnership with a pariah apartheid state becomes even more questionable. 
(87) 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
For decades, many groups had looked at Washington to play a meaningful 
role in pressuring Pretoria to change its ways.  Ironically, successive US 
administrations failed to fulfil those expectations. (88)  Strategies formulated 
to deal with turbulence in the Third World followed no fixed pattern.  
Successive US foreign policy architects rather than examining Africa’s 
affairs in terms of regional concerns, frequently adopted a narrow 
ideological view of the issues at stake. Urnov observes that whatever policy 
the West put forward for Southern Africa, the interest of Pretoria was given 
maximum consideration.  Liberation movements in the region in their quest 
for national independence and self determination sought and receive 
assistance from the former Soviet Union in the absence of such support from 
the West.  As such, they were perceived as advancing Communist 
agendas.(89) 
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In the final analyses, no amount of imperialist planning and intervention 
could stem the tide of the struggle for self-determination and national 
independence. (90)  
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3 THE NAMIBIAN QUESTION 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Namibia, formerly known as South West Africa was taken from Germany 
during World War I and was officially declared a mandate under the League 
of Nations.  South Africa, after having been mandated to administer Namibia 
on behalf of the League of Nations virtually treated it as a fifth province by 
extending its own discriminatory legislation.  By 1966 the UNGA, including 
the US voted in the affirmative to revoke South Africa’s mandate through 
resolution 2145 of 1966, on the grounds of maladministration. (90)  This 
decision was further reinforced by the ICJ, which on 21 June 1971, declared 
South Africa’s continued occupation of Namibia as illegal and ordered it to 
withdraw its administration immediately.  South Africa however, refused to 
yield to the demands of the world body and the international community 
and, began a long range programme of obstructing the settlement of the 
Namibian question.  This chapter will examine in detail 1) the struggle for 
independence in Namibia, 2) the adoption of UNSC resolution 435 of 1978 
as a blueprint for the settlement of the Namibian question and 3) the 
obstructionist posture of the Washington-Pretoria alliance aimed at 
checkmating Soviet expansionism in the region, thereby holding the 
Namibian question hostage to the US-Soviet rivalry. Namibia attained 
independence on 21 March 1990, more than a decade since the initial 
agreement on its independence was reached. (91) 
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3.2 The struggle for independence in Namibia 
 
Namibia’s struggle for national liberation and independence has been a long 
and protracted one.  We came to witness that by the late 1960s and early 
1970s, the struggle for national liberation and self-determination has 
changed both in character and scope.  This was so because of the US 
intervention in the region. SWAPO, one of the major liberation movements, 
adopted a threefold strategy aimed at abolishing South Africa’s illegal 
occupation of Namibia.  The first premise being the adoption of a strategy 
based on direct or indirect military confrontation, secondly mass internal 
mobilization and thirdly diplomatic contacts with the international 
community to steer and rekindle its cause.  (92) 
 
It is in fact important to note that SWAPO in its efforts to end Namibia’s 
illegal occupation lent much allegiance to the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc 
nations.  It in turn received tremendous support from these nations and was 
labelled as Communist.  Paradoxically, Nyerere observes that nationalist 
movements then could not be particular in accepting assistance from 
whatever corner for their cause; they had to take advantage of any 
opportunity that presented itself. (93)  Mokoena consolidates this position by 
stating that liberation movements in the region, in their quest for national 
liberation, sought and received generous assistance form the Soviet Union in 
the absence of such support from the West. (94) 
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As it turned out, this in the long run dearly cost nationalist movements in 
terms of diplomatic and political bargaining.  It is submitted that given the 
US Cold War anti-Soviet policies, SWAPO’s particular association with the 
East further antagonized the US.  This is recognized as one of the major 
factors responsible for the delay in the early implementation of the UNSC 
resolution 435 of 1978. (95) 
 
As already pointed out in the foregoing sections, Washington had never been 
in favour of a SWAPO-led administration once the question of Namibia was 
resolved.  Thus, the US foreign policy objective in respect of Namibia was 
structured in such a way that could elicit an arrangement that would at best 
exclude all possibilities of a SWAPO administration in an independent 
Namibia.  In the light of this, the UNSC resolution 435 of 1978, would only 
serve as an instrument leading to a transition for independence in Namibia, 
and not as a basis for a full agreement. (96) 
 
As all avenues for a peaceful resolution of the Namibian question appeared 
to be remote, particularly in the light of the 1966 ruling of the ICJ, SWAPO 
on 18 July 1966 announced its intensions to take up arms for the liberation 
of Namibia.  According to the then Secretary-General of SWAPO, Herman 
Andimba Toivo ya Toivo, “the ICJ ruling came as a bitter disappointment 
that left the leaders of SWAPO with a feeling of betrayal”.  It was SWAPO’s 
consideration that apartheid South Africa, given its past record cannot be  
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trusted.  In addition, SWAPO declared, “that the effect of the ICJ ruling was 
that it had relieved it from any illusion that it had about the UN”. SWAPO 
thus, had no other alternative, but to take up arms as a means of securing 
Namibia’s early independence.  By August 26, 1966, the first military clash 
between PLAN, the military wing of SWAPO and the SADF took place at 
Ongulumbashe, a remote village in northwestern Namibia. (97) 
 
On the margins of this, diplomatic efforts relating to the Namibian question 
were gaining momentum, which in the end resulted in the establishment of 
an ad-hoc committee of the UNSC.  This ad-hoc committee was tasked with 
the responsibility of further exploring ways and means for the 
implementation of all UNSC resolutions.  Because of this committee’s 
findings, the Namibian issue was referred back to the ICJ, whereby it was 
asked regarding the legal consequences of South Africa’s continued 
presence in Namibia.  By June 1971, the ICJ ruled that apartheid South 
Africa’s continued occupation of Namibia, was illegal and contrary to the 
spirit and letter of international law. This indeed, signalled a major 
diplomatic victory for SWAPO.  The ICJ further ruled that UN member 
states were under the obligation to recognize the illegality of the South 
Africa’s presence in Namibia. (98) 
 
By September 1972, at a meeting of the UNSC, South Africa responded by 
rejecting the ICJ ruling, at which the then AG to Namibia, Van der Walt 
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remarked that, “we will continue to govern South West Africa as in the 
past”.  As 1976 drew closer, further developments that appeared more 
favourable to SWAPO took place: the adoption of the UNSC resolution 385 
of 1976, which unanimously condemned South Africa for:  
- its continued illegal occupation of Namibia;  
- its illegal and arbitrary application of racially discriminatory and 
repressive laws and practices in Namibia; 
- its military build-up and utilization of the territory as a base for 
acts of destabilization against neighbouring states;  
- its failure to comply with the UNSC resolution of 1974, and 
- all its attempts to evade the clear mandate of the UN for the 
holding of free and fair elections under the supervision and control 
of the UN. (99) 
 
 
It is in fact important to note that at this stage subsequent to the post- 
Vietnam era as well as, the Watergate scandal,  the US involvement in the 
region had been scaled-down.  At the same time, apartheid South Africa’s 
international standing had been severely damaged following its invasion of 
Angola and, in particular the 16 June 1976 ruthless suppression of the 
Soweto student protests.  With a fair amount of political changes taking 
place internationally, the Namibia question remained a pariah of 
international dispute, insofar as South Africa’s illegal presence in that 
country was concerned. (100) 
 
It was no coincidence that the NAM also joined the fray in supporting the 
cause of the Namibian people, given the then three camps of the Cold-War 
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era.  SWAPO, at first holding observer status from 1973, became a full 
member of the NAM by 1978.  The NAM had always been viewing the 
question of Namibia as a political one, and in particular an issue of 
decolonization and independence, a process that started back in the 1960s in 
Africa.  It was indeed the political view of the NAM that Namibia’s 
independence and its right to self-determination itself was very critical to the 
maintenance of world peace, stability and security as spelt out in the UN 
charter.  Therefore, Namibia represented a decades old issue of 
independence and sovereignty.  In addition, it uncovered how trans-nationals 
benefited from South Africa’s continued illegal occupation of that country. It 
further uncovered how the governments of these conglomerates, in particular 
France, West-Germany and Canada attempted to delay the peaceful 
resolution of the Namibian question.  These were deliberate delaying tactics 
aimed at further guaranteeing the continued exploitation of Namibia’s 
natural resources. (101) 
 
In the light of this, numerous reasons were documented regarding the most 
pertinent factors that contributed to the delay in implementing the UN 
instruments for Namibia’s early independence.  As pointed out above, the 
motives were purely economic and strategic.  Geographic studies have 
proved that the Namibian territory contains vast and immense deposits of 
strategic minerals that were of vital importance to the US, in particular and 
other Western countries’ industrial economies, especially uranium. 
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Therefore, markets for extraction and consumption needed to be accessible 
to US trade, and it indeed took an active role in opening up Asia and Africa.  
The US domestic prosperity is closely tied to foreign policy and this 
connection was neither lost on the voters nor on to those who hoped to win 
the support of the US voters. (102) 
 
It should be remembered that, there indeed had been clear and serious 
conflict of interests amongst the Western powers, particularly amongst the 
“Western Contact Group”.  This group, at the same time sought to negotiate 
Namibia’s independence with apartheid South Africa.  Suffice to say, this 
cosy relations of negotiations in the end turned out to be a bilateral affair 
between the former and the latter. The results of such shameful dealings 
meant that the affected people were further pushed to margins and were only 
consulted when it was deemed necessary.  These very countries at the same 
time participated in the control and exploitation of, and accumulation of 
profits from the illegal trade of Namibia’s uranium and many other mineral 
resources. (103) 
 
This in fact was in clear violation of Decree No. 1 of 27 September 1974, as 
adopted by the UNCN established in 1967, following the UN’s resolution 
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2145 (XXI) of 1966, that revoked South Africa’s mandate over Namibia.  
This Decree inter alia stated that: 
-   no person or entity, whether a body corporate or unincorporated 
may search for, prospect for, explore for, take, extract, mine, 
process, refine, use, sell, export or distribute any natural resource, 
whether animal or mineral, situated, or found to be situated within 
the territorial limits of Namibia without the permission of the 
UNCN; 
-  any permission, concession or license granted by any person or 
entity, including anybody purporting to act under the authority of 
the government of South Africa or the administration of South 
West Africa or their predecessors is null and void and of no effect 
or force; 
-  no animal resource, mineral or other natural resources produced in 
or emanating from the territory of Namibia may be taken outside 
the territorial limits of Namibia without the consent or permission 
of the UNCN;  
-  any animal or mineral resource produced in or emanating from the 
territory of Namibia which shall be taken from the said territory 
without the consent or written authority of the UNCN may be 
seized and shall be forfeited to the benefit of the said Council and 
held in trust for the people of Namibia. (104) 
 
The view this thesis wishes to submit, was that this Decree was 
unambiguous insofar as the exploitation of the natural resources of colonial 
nations were concerned.  Yet, we found that most of these Western nations 
sustained and further buttressed such illegal activities in the face of even 
further stipulations that stated that, “any person or entity or corporation 
which contravenes the present decree in respect of Namibia, may be held 
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liable in damages by the future government of Namibia”. (105)  More 
important and given the above observations, what mattered most at the time 
were the economic, political, and strategic interests of these countries in the 
region.  Therefore, the management and further development of a strategy of 
underdevelopment as pointed out by Frank in most of his development of 
underdevelopment theories.  In his analysis, Frank asserted that the present 
imperialist and capitalist intervention in the Third World, was a deliberate 
attempt to develop underdevelopment, in particular Namibia, to take a recent 
example. Therefore, the interpretation that “the expropriation of economic 
surpluses from these countries and their appropriation by imperialist powers, 
including the polarization of the capitalist system into a metropolitan centre 
of peripheral satellites. Additionally, this propelled the generation of 
underdevelopment in the peripheral satellites whose economic surpluses 
were expropriated while producing economic development in the 
metropolitan centres”. (106) 
 
As South Africa and its imperialist allies in breach of the UNSC Decree 
No.1, continued to exploit Namibia’s natural resources, the UNSC instructed 
the office of the UN Commissioner for Namibia to investigate mechanisms 
for the enforcement of the Decree.  This was to be done against the 
background of initiating necessary legal action.  By 1976, the UNSC 
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reflected the concerns of the international community against South Africa’s 
persistent refusal to comply with the resolutions and decisions of the UNCN 
on Namibia.  It pertinently elucidated the importance of the advisory opinion 
of the ICJ.  Resolution 385 of 1976 was subsequently adopted, which 
unequivocally demanded South Africa’s withdrawal from Namibia and the 
transfer of power to the people of Namibia. It furthermore called for the 
holding of free and fair elections under the UN’s supervision and control for 
the whole of Namibia.  By 1978, the governments of France, Canada, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, the US and the UK, formulated a proposal for 
the peaceful settlement of the Namibian question.  This proposal was 
accepted by both SWAPO and South Africa on 28 April and 12 July 1978, 
respectively.  Based on a detailed survey conducted by the SG’s Special 
Representative while in Namibia, the UNSC approved the report in its 
resolution, which came to be known as the UNSC resolution 435 of 1978.  
This resolution inter alia, established an internationally recognized peace 
formula for Namibia’s transition to independence.  However, as pointed out 
in the foregoing parts of this study, South Africa and its allies, particularly 
the US, were not really committed to the said peace plan.  It was their view 
that this plan should only serve as a means to a transition, and not a full 
agreement. (107) 
 
Having been declared illegal in Namibia by the ICJ in 1971 and the demand 
put forward for its complete withdrawal from that territory, South Africa and 
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Washington, continued with their delaying tactics. They came forward with 
issues and demands that were totally irrelevant and unrelated to the peace 
formula for a transition to independence in Namibia.  Such was the demand 
on the UNSC’s ability to prove its impartiality on the matter before it.  It 
goes without saying that both South African and the US were fearful that 
SWAPO would get an overwhelming majority if the peace plan was 
implemented as agreed upon then.  Therefore, a strategy to buy more time 
was developed and adopted by the two allies.  Furthermore, apartheid South 
Africa adopted a dual strategy aimed at obstructing, or even disrupting 
negotiations on the modalities for implementing the peace plan.  It used the 
time thus gained to impose its own internal solutions in the form of an 
administration subservient and accountable only to it. (108) 
 
As a result of these manoeuvres, we came to witness the formation of the 
Turnhalle Conference on 18 August 1976, comprising representatives of 
various ethnic entities.  Subsequent to this Conference was the 4-8 
December 1978 unilateral elections, which were held under the auspices of 
the South African government. (109)  The DTA, an ethnically composed 
political alliance emerged as the overall winner of the elections.  It should 
however, be noted that SWAPO did not partake in these elections, as it was 
contrary to the letter and spirit of the UNSC resolution 435 adopted on 
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29 September 1978.  The UNSC upon learning about the unilateral elections 
held under the auspices of the South African government, declared the 
elections nil and void and of no force. (110) 
 
South Africa, subsequent to the 4-8 December 1978 unilateral elections, 
which subsequently saw the coming into being of the IG, came under 
tremendous opposition both from within Namibia and the international 
community.  Persistent calls for the imposition of mandatory sanctions and 
disinvestments were repeatedly shielded by South Africa’s main trading 
partners, the UK, US and France by using their veto rights in the UNSC.  
The US policy strategies in relation to apartheid Pretoria have always been 
shifting from moderate to conservative, the former entailing the broadening 
of ties with both the region’s white- and black-ruled states.  These strategies 
also encapsulated the softening of political and economic pressures on 
white-ruled states based on the then held assumption that “the whites are 
here to stay and the only way constructive change can come about is through 
them.  There is no hope for blacks to gain the political rights they seek 
through violence, which will only lead to chaos and increased opportunities 
for the communist”. (111)   
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On the military front, the brisk encounters that commenced on 26 August 
1966, was intensifying, given Pretoria’s intransigence and total disregard of 
international opinion aimed at paving the way for the transfer of power in 
Namibia. (112)  In addition, the mid-1970s provided the US policy makers 
with alarming evidence of growing instability in the white controlled states 
of Southern Africa. Of particular concern was the introduction of Cuban 
troops and Soviet personnel in Angola. Similarly, the Mugabe-Nkoma 
inspired guerrilla onslaught on the Smith regime in the then Rhodesia was 
gaining momentum and growing in intensity.  Moreover, the startling 
success of the Arab oil boycott raised overall concern in relation to the 
West’s continued access to the rich mineral resources of Southern Africa 
should such come under the control of unfriendly Soviet-oriented states.  At 
this point in time, the issue of transition in Namibia moved to centre stage 
and was further reinvigorated by Zimbabwe’s independence in April 1980. 
(113) 
 
As these events unfolded, it became clear to the US policy makers that the 
pace of turmoil in the region needed to be halted.  First there was a clear 
manifestation that major changes had taken place, insofar as they relate to 
the political structure of the region and the pressure for continued change 
that carried the threat of massive violence.  Secondly, the eventual outcome 
of this explosive situation would obviously have a pervasive impact not only 
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regionally, but on the entire world community.  In addition, the means by 
which change occurs may have a major impact on the future race relations in 
South Africa and the rest of the world.  Therefore, the policy choices made 
by the US would be crucial not only to South Africa, but also to the 
international community in general and to the US role in the development of 
a secure and just system of global public order.  Thus, the operationalization 
of a containment strategy, which was later consolidated into the 
“constructive engagement” approach with the ascent to the presidency of 
Ronald Reagan.  (114) 
 
When Reagan assumed office in 1981, a complete review of the US foreign 
policy toward Southern Africa was carried out.  The Reagan administration 
was convinced that the Carter administration had been too soft on 
communists in the region and too harsh on the US traditional allies in South 
Africa.  Dr. Crocker was assigned the task of coining the “constructive 
engagement” approach, which indeed proved to be a singular failure of the 
Reagan administration in its infancy stages. (115)  Urnov concurs with this 
position by observing that the ineffectiveness of this approach led to a split 
amongst the US ruling class over ties with apartheid Pretoria. Urnov further 
gave as testimony the passage of a law by Congress in October 1986 which 
imposed a number of compulsory economic sanctions against Pretoria, amid 
desperate opposition from the administration. (116) 
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According to Mokoena, the “constructive engagement” strategy rested on 
four interrelated assumptions, as per the 1987 Report of the Secretary of 
State’s Advisory Committee on South Africa, namely that: 
- South Africa’s overwhelming economic and military 
predominance in Southern Africa, and its powerful internal 
security apparatus, would at least in the short term enable Pretoria 
to manage external pressures for change; 
- The Botha government would be induced to agree to an 
internationally acceptable settlement of the Namibia question if 
South African withdrawal from Namibia were linked to both a 
Cuban pull-out from Angola and to prospects for an improvement 
in US-South Africa relations; 
- An early Namibia settlement would set in motion a self-reinforcing 
spiral of positive developments throughout Southern Africa, thus 
validating the constructive engagement approach; and 
- Progress could be made more quickly on apartheid issues if the US 
government used official, rather than public channels for its 
criticism and pressures. (117) 
 
As already pointed out in the foregoing sections, these assumptions were 
grossly misplaced, given Pretoria’s continued raids into Angola, which 
further ignited an escalation in violence.  This subsequently resulted in the 
South African Air Force attacks on 17 March 1981, on a SWAPO base in 
Lubango, approximately two hundred kilometres north of the Namibian-
Angola border.  This was the deepest known attack in Angola by the South 
African Air Force, since the SADF’s 1975-1976 incursions. (118)  Pretoria 
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believed that its overwhelming military superiority in the region and its 
capability of bringing brute force to bear on neighbouring countries would 
solve the problems in Southern Africa.  Similarly, Pretoria found common 
ground with the US over its behaviour.  There was the believe that this 
direction of its foreign policy accorded fully with Washington’s approach of 
using force where necessary to bend other nations to its will.  In other words, 
Pretoria’s main objective in broadening its scale of aggression and 
subversive activities was to convince states in the region that hostilities 
against it were futile and threatened their own existence. (119)   
 
Meanwhile, PLAN, the military wing of SWAPO however, did not relent.  
Supported by the Cuban-FAPLA forces, it launched massive offensives 
against South African targets.  President Reagan at this point in time, on 19 
March 1981 requested Congress to repeal the 1976 Clark Amendment in 
order to remove an unnecessary restriction on his foreign policy authority.  
On 17 April 1981, Dr. Crocker visited Angola en route from South Africa 
and informed the Angolan government that progress on the Namibia 
question was related to the Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola.  This was 
the first public statement by a senior US government official linking the two 
situations. (120) 
 
A major military showdown began in August 1987, subsequent to sporadic 
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military encounters in the intervening period up to 1985.  This all began 
when FAPLA embarked on an offensive against the town of Mavinga held 
by UNITA since 1981.  Pretoria, the main backer of UNITA as a US proxy 
repelled this offensive, by intervening in a cross-border operation from 
Namibia with the strategic objective to capture the MPLA government 
stronghold of Cuito Cuanavale by March 1988.  The bottom-line of this 
objective was to open up for UNITA to launch even deeper attacks into 
Angolan territory while being protected by the South African Air Force 
support, thereby creating a security zone in the centre-south of the country.  
This was to be followed by the installation of a provisional government at 
the UNITA headquarters in Jamba. (121) 
 
By early 1988, prospects for peace followed by the implementation of the 
UN settlement plan for Namibia became more elusive.  In response to South 
Africa’s incursions into Angola in late 1987, Cuban reinforcements arrived 
in the form of the 50th Division, headed by Gen. Ochoa Sanchez.  Gen. 
Ochoa Sanchez was a personality with formidable military experience and 
indeed the architect of the victory against the SADF-US invasion of Angola 
in 1975 and 1976. (122)  By May 1988, 11 000 Cuban-FAPLA troops, backed 
by several tactical PLAN units, established a 400 kilometre southern front, 
running parallel and at some points no further than 20 kilometres from the 
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Namibian northern border.  The Cuban-FAPLA forces were protected by 
some advanced MIG 23s and helicopter gunship, plus 200 tanks, artillery, air 
defence radar and five air-to-surface missile systems.  The SADF/SWATF 
military intelligence, having learned this had no options out, particularly 
when considering military and political implications that goes with it and 
went on the defensive, mining their existing lines and retreated into 
Namibia.  The SADF/SWATF for the purpose of military tactics established 
bases in the proximity of Ponhofi Secondary School. (123) Following the 
ensuing skirmishes two students were killed in the process, which saw 
approximately 35 000 students throughout Namibia taking their protest to 
the streets.  They demanded the immediate withdrawal of the 
SADF/SWATF forces from the proximity of schools.  It was indeed very 
much apparent, given the protestations from civilians that both sides wanted 
to avoid confrontations at all cost. (124) 
 
Reports of South African fatalities first began to filter trough in November 
1988, when more than twenty deaths were announced by Pretoria, including 
its first public admission of its military interventions in Angola.  
Simultaneously, a call for a negotiated settlement to the regional conflict 
emerged when all parties concerned recognized that a purely military 
solution was no longer feasible.  South Africa’s loss of vital air superiority, 
with a consequent increase in the domestic politically sensitive “white 
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body” count, prompted Pretoria to reassess its entire Angola/Namibia 
strategy.  It goes without saying that the Cuito Cuanavale confrontations, 
which presented a massive challenge to Pretoria’s military superiority, 
signalled a shift in the balance of regional military power away from South 
Africa.  Obviously, operating more than 300 kilometres from the Namibian 
border and over 400 kilometres away from their nearest main base, 
Grootfontein, the SADF had become logistically overextended.  O’Neil and 
Munslow further consolidate this assumption by stating that because of the 
new tactical moves of the Cuban and FAPLA forces, an estimated 4000 
SADF troops involved in the battle for Cuito Cuanavale, had risked 
becoming bogged down in the Angolan rainy season.  This could have had 
disastrous consequences, having their route cut off back into northern 
Namibia.  Hence, the announcement of a formal ceasefire on 8 August 1988. 
(125)   
 
As it transpired diplomacy now was more in demand than ever before to 
help secure peace and stability in the sub-region.  As these confrontations 
came to a head and a military stalemate was reached, the only avenue open 
was to test diplomacy once again.  Nevertheless, how does one define the 
fundamental factors of a diplomatic agenda aimed at achieving a political 
solution beneficial to two opposing sides?  It is submitted that such an 
agenda would require the two parties to bring things to a head one way, or 
the other.  Therefore, the emphasis should be on the role of seizing an 
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opportunity that presents itself when it exists.  According to Dr. Crocker, the 
assertion is that “when the door is open even though you don’t know what 
lies behind that door, it would be a mistake not to explore it fully and see 
what it could lead to if you walk through that door”.  It is therefore 
important to conceptualize realistic options, scenarios and strategies aimed 
at avoiding, or otherwise minimizing further conflict, he concluded (126) 
 
With hindsight, because of  mounting internal and external criticism and 
pressures, a South African delegation led by the then Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, R. F. Botha, met with a US delegation led by Dr. Crocker in Geneva 
on 14 March 1988.  This conference had the objective to further explore 
possibilities for a peaceful resolution of the Namibian question, 
subsequently dubbed the Geneva protocol.  A similar delegation headed by 
Neil van Heerden, Pretoria’s then Director-General for Foreign Affairs, met 
in London with an Angolan-Cuban delegation from 2-4 May 1988.  These 
meetings were followed by another meeting on 13 May 1988, in Brazzaville, 
Congo, which was indicative of the progress being made in resolving the 
Namibian issue once and for all. (127) 
 
It should be remembered that although the 1988 talks and protocols were 
more intense and active than the then-on-and-then-off talks and negotiations, 
the Namibia peace formula however, was not about to sail trough 
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easily.  Although in hiatus, it was indeed evident that all the parties had a 
desire to at least bring things to a head, but not without major compromises 
and concessions.  This, the argument is advanced was made possible by a 
combination of various aspects, in particular the war which had its risks and 
the economic burdens that goes with it, including the scheduled elections in 
the US. (128)  By 20 July 1988, a further meeting took place at Governors 
Island, New York, culminating in the finalization of the New York 
principles, which heralded the first major political breakthrough.  South 
Africa, Cuba and Angola agreed and accepted the New York principles for a 
peaceful settlement of the Namibian question, which were important in two 
respects, namely:  
- First the principle of linkage between the Cuban troop withdrawal 
from Angola and the implementation of the UNSC resolution 435 of 
1978, were clearly confirmed, and  
- Secondly, a number of important principles regulating the future type 
of government in an independent Namibia were laid down.  Prominent 
amongst these was the acceptance of the responsibility of states not to 
permit their respective territories to be used for acts of war, aggression 
or violence against other states. (129) 
 
 
 
In any event, the format and spirit paved by these often in hiatus talks finally 
leading to the implementation of the Namibian peace plan became more 
apparent as time passed on.  For Dr. Chester Crocker, the most important 
aspect of the process was to get these negotiations focused on the end-game; 
to relate the cessation of hostilities to the building of peace. 
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Therefore, the focus was on the existing military situation and the apparent 
prospects for peace.  It is argued that the most appropriate diplomatic 
strategy enunciated was the application of a single-document strategy, which 
contained a number of differences rather than agreements.  This in turn made 
it incumbent on the negotiators to get rid of all the disagreements in order to 
have an agreed upon language to carry the process forward.  This 
subsequently happened during the next round of talks held in Geneva from 
2-5 August 1988 viewed as the final breakthrough on the road to lasting 
peace in Namibia. Concluding the talks with Dr. Crocker, the then Soviet 
Deputy Foreign Minister, Anatoly Adamashin, notes “a positive 
momentum” toward resolving the conflict and predicts a settlement in the 
“nearest future”. (130)   The Geneva protocol was indeed very much rigorous, 
in that it set the target dates for the conclusion of the peace process and the 
disengagement of all opposing forces. (131) 
 
By 22 December 1988, a tri-partite peace agreement was signed between 
Angola, South Africa and Cuba, setting 1 April 1989, as the target date for 
the implementation of the Namibian peace plan.  Simultaneously, Angola 
and Cuba signed a bilateral accord, confirming the linkage of Cuban troop 
withdrawal to the transition to independence in Namibia. (132)   Now, the 
question is what brought about the urgency for negotiations?  Firstly, 
according to O’Neil and Munslow, since Gorbachev came to power in 1985, 
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there has been a marked shift from confrontation to co-operation. As early as 
March 1986, Gorbachev hinted at the Soviet Union’s objectives to seek 
political solutions to the Angolan conflict.  Yet it was unwilling to move 
away from the Angolan conflict, as doing so would have severely damaged 
Soviet prestige.  In addition, it would have eliminated the principal position 
affording the Soviet Union a role in the politics of Southern Africa.  Hence 
Moscow’s insistence on the Angolans to accept the linkage between 
independence for Namibia and Cuban troop pull out. (133) 
 
 Secondly, the US, particularly after the ascent to the presidency by Reagan 
developed the “constructive engagement” approach, which it presumed 
would encourage change in South Africa through dialogue rather than 
economic pressure.  The bottom-line of this approach however, also 
encapsulated a working relation with South Africa as a regional ally to 
combat Soviet and Cuban influence.  In other words, a perfect recipe for 
Cold War confrontation by proxy given that there were direct clashes 
between the Cubans and South Africa.  The US condoned South Africa to 
confront the Angolan government and the Soviet Union did not relent, it 
indeed indicated firmly that it did not intend deserting its allies.  
Consequently, this set the stage for an escalating confrontation in the 1980s 
which, as it transpired could not be conclusively resolved militarily.  On top 
of that was the mounting material, financial and  
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political costs.  (134) 
 
Available statistics are indicative that between 1985 and 1986, the Soviet 
Union supplied an extra US$ 2 billion in military aid to the MPLA, 
including more MIG-23 fighter planes, which proved decisive in tipping 
scale during the battle of Cuito Cuanavale.  Equally, South Africa during the 
same period faced a dramatic rise in military expenditure. Thus, the urgency 
with which the US pressed for a negotiated solution stemmed from both 
Cuito Cuanavale confrontations and its desire to have something to show for 
its eight-year policy of “constructive engagement”. (135) 
 
 
3.3 Resolution 435 of 1978 versus obstructionism 
As pointed out in the foregoing sections of this study the struggle for 
independence and self-determination in Namibia has been a long and 
protracted one.  Equally, its historiography, according to Gottschalk has long 
been dominated by a genre which invents the past, controls the present and 
prevents the future, namely apartheid, colonialism and imperialism. (136) 
 
Subsequent to a UNSC Meeting by 1976, it reflected on the concerns of the 
international community against South Africa’s persistent refusal to comply 
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with the resolutions and decisions of the UNCN. It further pertinently 
elucidated the importance of the advisory opinion of the ICJ on the transfer 
of power to the people of Namibia.  By 1978, the governments of France, 
Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, the US and the UK, formulated a 
proposal for the peaceful settlement of the Namibian question.  This 
proposal was accepted by both SWAPO and South Africa on 28 April and 
12 July 1978, respectively.  Based on a detailed survey conducted by the 
SG’s Special Representative while in Namibia, the UNSC approved the 
report in its resolution, which came to be known as the UNSC resolution 435 
of 1978.  This resolution inter alia, established an internationally recognized 
peace formula for Namibia’s transition to independence.  However, as 
pointed out in the foregoing sections of this study, South Africa and its 
allies, particularly the US, were not really committed to the said peace plan.  
It was their view that this plan should only serve as a means to a transition, 
and not a full agreement. (137) 
 
Having been declared illegal in Namibia by the ICJ in 1971, and the demand 
put forward for its complete withdrawal from that territory, South Africa and 
Washington joined hands to frustrate the fulfilment of the sacred trust of 
civilization. They came forward with issues and demands that were totally 
irrelevant and unrelated to the UNSC’s resolution 435 of 1978.  Such was 
the demand on the UNSC’s ability to prove its impartiality on the matter 
before it.  It goes without saying that both South African and the US were 
_________________________________ 
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fearful that SWAPO would get an overwhelming majority if the peace plan 
was implemented as agreed upon then.  Therefore, a strategy to buy more 
time was developed and adopted by the two allies.  Furthermore, apartheid 
South Africa adopted a dual strategy aimed at obstructing, or even disrupting 
negotiations on the modalities for implementing the peace plan.  It used the 
time thus gained to impose its own internal solutions in the form of an 
administration subservient and accountable only to it. (138) 
 
As a result of these manoeuvres, we came to witness the 4-8 December 1978 
unilateral elections, which were held under the auspices of the South African 
government. The DTA, an ethnically comprised political alliance emerged as 
the overall winner of the elections.  It should however, be noted that 
SWAPO did not partake in these elections, as it was contrary to the letter 
and spirit of the UNSC resolution 435 adopted in September 1978.  The 
UNSC, upon learning about the unilateral elections held under the auspices 
of the South African government, declared the elections nil and void and of 
no force. (139) 
 
South Africa subsequent to the 4-8 December 1978 unilateral elections, 
which subsequently saw the coming into being of the IG, came under 
tremendous opposition both from within Namibia and the international 
community.  Persistent calls for the imposition of mandatory sanctions and 
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disinvestments were repeatedly shielded by South Africa’s main trading 
partners, the UK, US and France by using their veto rights in the UNSC.  
Nevertheless, by 1982, the UNSC drafted a supplementary document aimed 
at strengthening and refining resolution 435 of 1978.  SWAPO immediately 
endorsed the document, which inter alia provided that certain Constitutional 
principles be written into the first independence Constitution.  It further 
made a provision that in the Constituent Assembly a two-thirds majority be 
required for decisions on the details of the future Constitution.  The said 
agreements on the Constitutional principles in turn provided for a 
declaration of Fundamental Human Rights Bill.  This Bill in turn made 
provision for the protection against arbitrary deprivation of private property 
without just compensation.  It furthermore instructs that the Namibian 
Supreme Court be the effective upper guardian of these rights and the 
Constitution in its entirety.  The Bill also provided for periodic and genuine 
elections for the Legislative and Executive branches of government which 
should be by secret ballot and on the basis of universal suffrage. (140) 
 
Apartheid South Africa in cohorts with Washington immediately after the 
1982 Agreements, in a further attempt to frustrate and prolong the 
implementation of the UN’s instruments leading to Namibia’s independence, 
raised another set of preconditions.  These preconditions included the 
withdrawal of the Cuban troops from Angola.  It should be remembered that  
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these preconditions were developed and managed by Dr. Chester Crocker, 
the then Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. Dr. Crocker, 
despite a favourable global balance of power persisted, to view Africa as a 
continuation of the struggle for global hegemony between the West, led by 
the US, and the Communist World, led by USSR (141) These perceptions at 
best highlighted the structural impediments, or rather the US policy makers’ 
inability to connect the dots.  These policies appeared to turn a blind-eye to 
the freedom deficit and human rights of the affected peoples, thereby stirring 
up discontent and hostility towards the US, as could be witnessed world-
wide.  As a matter of fact, this thesis submits that these preconditions were 
absurd and irrelevant and out of touch with the reality on the ground. Suffice 
to say, Angola at that point in time had already been a sovereign State that 
could not be drawn into issues that affects only Namibia.  In the final 
analysis, these are indeed the historical characteristics of the US policies, 
blanketed by a net of alienation and isolation. (142) 
 
The South African-appointed IG following the 4-8 December 1978 unilateral 
elections however, failed to make any impact whatsoever on the Namibian 
populace. South Africa by 1983, resumed direct control of the territory by 
appointing an AG and dissolving the National Assembly and the Council of 
Ministers. Realizing the bankruptcy of the old model geared toward 
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solving the Namibian question, Pretoria invented a new one.  It decided that 
it was time to change the mask on the puppets.  This was a deliberate 
attempt to make them look like a force, which was broader and more 
representative than the DTA, capable of distancing itself from South Africa 
and acting in the interests of a genuine national accord. (143)  Subsequently, 
on 18 July 1983, apartheid South Africa issued a proclamation for the 
creation of a Multi-Party State Council.  This Council was renamed the 
Multi-Party Conference that governed the territory under South Africa’s 
auspices. (144) 
 
This thesis submits that apartheid South Africa had committed itself to have 
no further objections than those pertaining to the withdrawal of the Cuban 
troops from Angola before a final agreement could be reached on the 
Namibian question.  Within this context, the argument is therefore advanced 
that South Africa indeed had abandoned, at least publicly its objections to 
the UNO’s bias in favour of SWAPO.  In addition, Washington through Dr. 
Crocker also gave the assurances that South Africa had accepted resolution 
435 as the only viable peace formula.  Thus, South Africa would proceed to 
implement the settlement plan provided that there was a commitment on the 
Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola. (145)    
 
Notwithstanding all these assurances, South Africa towards the end of 1983, 
in yet another sinister move initiated a political coalition aimed at 
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developing a viable alternative to SWAPO in the form of the mentioned 
MPC.  This coalition consisted of several internal political parties based on 
their ethnic and tribal allegiances.  It was boycotted by the NNF and 
SWAPO as another ploy to install a puppet administration.  As expected, 
some internal political leaders who had been suspicious of the move to 
appoint the MPC, such as chief Justus Garoëb of the DC, a few months later 
withdrew from the MPC. This heralded in a decisive blow to apartheid South 
Africa’s political manoeuvres and manipulations.  A further blow came with 
the pullout of SWANU-P by September 1984 from the MPC.   SWANU-P 
instead resolved to work in unison with SWAPO and at the same time 
declared its total support for the unconditional liberation of Namibia. (146) 
 
As these political metamorphoses were taking shape within Namibia, we 
came to witness yet another unilateral installation of a second interim 
administration by Pretoria.  The UNCN wasted no time in voicing its 
concern, condemning South Africa for its intransigence.  Within this context, 
it called upon the members of the UNSC to resume their undivided 
responsibilities for the immediate and unconditional implementation of the 
mentioned peace plan in respect of Namibia. (147) 
 
Ironically, and given South Africa’s assurances to the UNO by 1983 that the 
alleged prejudices in favour of SWAPO, were no longer an impediment  
_________________________________ 
146.  NPP Information Pamphlet 1 1989. Why can’t we look forward to resolution 435. Windhoek: 1 
147. The Choice 1989. Namibia peace plan 435 or society under siege. Windhoek: NPP Executive Paper. 14-16 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 80
to free and fair elections in terms of resolution 435 of 1978 it nevertheless 
continued unabated to encourage the IG and the leading army generals of the 
combined SADF/SWATF, to continue their propaganda of the alleged UN 
biases.  This presented another obstacle to the implementation of the peace 
instruments that would lead to a transition to independence in Namibia.  
Arguments that surfaced alluded to the fact that the settlement plan was not a 
creation of the UNO, but rather a formula of the “Western Contact Group”, 
which was endorsed by the UNSC and accepted by SWAPO, South Africa 
and Frontline States.  Therefore, Namibians elected as stipulated in the said 
resolution would be solely responsible for the drafting of the Constitution, 
and no one else.  Moreover, the principles of such a Constitution had already 
been agreed upon.  Thus, South Africa’s continued obstructionist stance on 
the implementation of the peace formula only raised questions on its 
credibility as a trustworthy party that could live-up to mutually agreed 
accords and decisions. (148) 
 
In any event, whatever criticism one could level against the attitude of the 
UNGA towards SWAPO, the UNGA was in no position whatsoever, to 
influence the outcome of any elections held in that territory. Therefore, such 
a deposition this thesis submits dismisses apartheid South Africa’s claim of 
alleged UNO bias with regard to the issue of Namibia.  The simple aspect is 
that the question of Namibia was an issue of decolonization that should have 
been resolved as such. (149) 
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According to Gottschalk, Namibia constituted a test case of the efficacy of 
the League of Nations’ Mandate system in providing legal checks and 
balances defending the rights and interest of an indigenous people against a 
colonizing power and its settlers.   Historically, apartheid Pretoria regarded 
Namibia as belonging to South Africa by right of conquest; it was part of the 
Afrikaner’s heritage.  In effect, South Africa ruled Namibia through a 
system of classical colonialism and was bent on continuing to do so within 
the context of the East-West rivalry.  It took advantage of the US posture 
against Soviet expansionism in the region. (150) 
 
Notwithstanding the UNSC’s selfless efforts to get resolution 435 of 1978 
implemented as agreed to by all parties concerned, South Africa once again 
attempted to frustrate the completion of the process.  This time around it 
levelled accusations against SWAPO of not being willing and committed to 
partake in a democratic process.  To the contrary, it was in fact SWAPO that 
consistently endorsed its commitments to the 1982-Agreements on the 
process to an elected CA, the Constitutional principles, a Human Rights Bill, 
and a host of agreements and decisions since 1978.  Undoubtedly, 
considering the above-mentioned factors, SWAPO had indeed shown its 
good faith while the IG backed by South Africa had either pretended that 
such agreements did not exist, or were blatantly undermining them.  
Moreover, the IG equally failed to clarify as to what it wanted to further 
negotiate and what it meant by “democratic process”, long after the passage 
of the UNSC resolution 435 of 1978. (151)  
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Certainly, what the IG wished to further negotiate this thesis submits was the 
capitulation of SWAPO, recognition of the IG itself, a re-negotiation, or 
scrapping of the UNSC resolution 435 of 1978, and the participation of 
SWAPO in the spoils of a government without any legitimacy.  It would 
have amounted to compromising the genuinely held aspirations to freedom 
and self-determination of the Namibia populace.  These sinister manoeuvres 
as it turned out for reasons obvious to everyone were rejected by SWAPO. 
SWAPO, by this move demonstrated its firm commitment to the 
internationally recognized peace formula and democracy as envisaged in the 
UNSC resolution 435 of 1978.  It was also a show of firm commitment to 
the agreements and decisions concluded thereafter. (152) 
 
As all these attempts by apartheid South Africa and its allies in Namibia, in 
cohorts with the Reagan administration, appeared to have no impact in 
winning the minds and hearts of the Namibian populace, another set of 
preconditions for the implementation of the said peace plan surfaced.  The 
demand that reconciliation be achieved first, followed by the implementation 
of resolution 435 of 1978 was now put forward. How this would be achieved 
was not spelt out in clear terms and in addition, it would have gone against 
the wishes and aspirations of the Namibia people who associated successive 
Pretoria administrations with repression. (153) 
 
It is in fact evident from the 1984-Cape Verde talks that South Africa did 
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not wish to implement the UN peace formula for Namibia.  South Africa 
instead, requested SWAPO during those talks to lay down arms and 
participate in the existing constitutional arrangements under its auspices.  As 
already pointed out above Pretoria came forward with the condition that a 
Constitution be drafted first followed by the implementation of the peace 
plan for Namibia and subsequent elections.  This, Pretoria maintained would 
not as much be a re-negotiation of the UNSC resolution 435 of 1978. It 
would only serve as a means aimed getting the priorities straight.  Pretoria 
further argued that such an arrangement would also lay the foundations for 
further initiatives and actions, which indeed as expected were rejected by 
SWAPO, who on several occasions stood firm to its commitment to the 
UNSC peace formula for Namibia. (154) 
 
In a letter dated 3 March 1986, Pretoria having realized that all its attempts 
aimed at derailing the UNSC peace plan for Namibia had failed complained 
to the UNSC.  It cited the continued presence of the Cuban troops in Angola 
as the last remaining obstacle towards the implementation of the said plan.  
Thus, a U-turn to the linkage doctrine officially masterminded by the then 
US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Dr. Chester Crocker.  
President Jose Eduardo dos Santos of Angola in response, in a letter dated 
13 March 1986 to the UNSC rejected the linkage of Namibia’s independence 
to the Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola.  He at the same time    
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expressed his willingness to offer his co-operation in the negotiations that 
would ensure Namibia’s early independence, thereby creating opportunities 
for lasting peace in the sub-region.  President Dos Santos also indicated that 
within the context of Washington’s active military and financial support to 
Dr. Jonas Malheiro Savimbi’s UNITA, the UNSG should take the future 
responsibility to resolve this standoff.  By 15 March 1986, the UNSG 
indicated his readiness to begin with the implementation of the Namibian 
peace plan on 1 August 1986. (155)  
 
In the light of the above-mentioned elements and given the US sponsored 
linkage doctrine, one finds it absurd and erroneous. This is so when 
considering the fact that the UNSC resolution 435 of 1978 was accepted by 
Pretoria then.  In addition, the Cuban troops had been in Angola since 1976.  
Now the question is; why is this issue being raised as a precondition only in 
1982?  Moreover, the Cuban troop presence in Angola preceded the said 
resolution and a host of agreements and decisions reached thereafter. (156)  
 
Meanwhile, South Africa tried its level best to bulldoze, lure and flatter the 
internal opposition into the IG.  This was evident of the Pretoria appointed 
AG, Adv. Louis Pienaar’s actions by March 1987.  Adv. Pienaar, with the 
blessing of State President P. W. Botha, launched a new initiative to broaden 
the base of the IG.  He authorized the holding of ethnic elections that would   
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facilitate participation in the IG of ethnic leaders elected in such elections.  It 
is this thesis’ submission that this strategy was particularly aimed at the co-
option of the DC and the CDA of Chief Justus Garoëb and Peter Kalangula, 
respectively.  These two ethnic leaders were perceived as having the 
majority ethnic following within Namibia.  Thus, a clear manifestation of 
Pretoria’s belief and rightly so, that the IG in its composition then stood no 
chance of obtaining the needed credibility nationally and internationally as 
long as the DC and the CDA remained outside the IG. (157) 
 
By early 1988, prospects of peace followed by the implementation of the 
UNSC peace plan for Namibia became all the more elusive. It became clear 
that the US sponsored linkage doctrine as a precondition was not the only 
obstacle for the implementation of the said process.  Apart from this linkage 
policy the IG raised another set of obstacles of its own, referring to the 
mentioned UNSC peace plan as defunct and outdated.  Ironically these were 
the very same politicians who shortly afterwards claimed to be the guardians 
of resolution 435 of 1978, portraying SWAPO as a communist dictatorship 
that had lost touch with Namibian realities.  Further allegations were 
levelled that SWAPO was only interested in seizing power by force as it was 
afraid to contest free and fair elections.  On the margins of these political in-
fights, sporadic military encounters occurred between the Cuban-FAPLA 
forces supported by the PLAN fighters and the SADF/SWATF and UNITA 
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forces.  By May 1988, 11 000 Cuban-FAPLA troops, backed by several 
tactical PLAN units, established a 400 kilometre southern front, running 
parallel and at some points no further than 20 kilometres from the Namibian 
northern border.  These clashes culminated in the battle of Cuito Cuanavale.  
According to O’Neil and Munslow, the final showdown began in August 
1987 with South African fatalities filtering through in November. (158) As 
these confrontations came to a head and a military stalemate was reached, 
the only avenue open was to test diplomacy once again.  It should be noted 
that it was indeed a time in which diplomacy was more in demand than ever 
before, to help secure peace and stability in the sub-region.  In other words, 
the definition of the fundamental factors of a diplomatic agenda aimed at 
achieving a political solution beneficial to two opposing sides.  Such an 
agenda in turn required the two parties to bring things to a head one way or 
the other.  Therefore, the emphasis was put on the role of seizing an 
opportunity that presents itself when it exists.  According to Dr. Chester 
Crocker, the assertion is that when the door is open, even though you don’t 
know what lay behind that door it would be a mistake not to explore it fully, 
and see what it could lead to if you walk through that door.  It is therefore 
important to conceptualize realistic options, scenarios and strategies aimed 
at avoiding, or otherwise minimizing further conflict. (159) 
 
Resultant of the mounting criticism and pressures, a South African 
delegation led by the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, R.F. Botha, met with   
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a US delegation led by Dr. Chester Crocker in Geneva on 14 March 1988.  
This conference had the objective to further explore possibilities for a 
peaceful resolution of the Namibian question, subsequently dubbed the 
Geneva protocol.  A similar delegation headed by Neil van Heerden, 
Pretoria’s then Director-General for Foreign Affairs, met in London with an 
Angolan-Cuban delegation from 2-4 May 1988.  These meetings, was 
followed by another meeting on 13 May 1988 in Brazzaville, Congo, which 
was indicative of the progress being made in resolving the Namibian issue 
once and for all. (160) 
 
This was made possible by a combination of various elements, in particular 
the war which had its risks and the economic burdens that goes with it, 
including the scheduled elections in the US. (161)  By 20 July 1988, a further 
meeting took place at Governors Island, New York, culminating in the 
finalization of the New York principles, which heralded the first major 
political breakthrough.  South Africa, Cuba and Angola agreed and accepted 
the New York principles for a peaceful settlement of the Namibian question, 
which according to political analysts were important in two respects, 
namely:  
- First the principle of linkage between the Cuban troop withdrawal 
form Angola and the implementation of the UNSC resolution 435 
of 1978, was clearly confirmed, and 
-  Secondly, a number of important principles regulating the future   
type of government in an independent Namibia were laid down.  
Prominent amongst these was the acceptance of the responsibility  
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of war, aggression or violence against other states. (162) 
 
In any event, the format and spirit paved by these talks, finally leading to the 
implementation of the Namibian peace plan became more apparent as time 
passed on.  For Dr. Chester Crocker, the most important aspect of the 
process was to get these negotiations focused on the end-game; to relate the 
cessation of hostilities to the building of peace. Therefore, the focus was on 
the existing military situation and the apparent prospects for peace.  It is 
argued that the most appropriate diplomatic strategy enunciated, was the 
application of a single-document strategy, which contained a number of 
differences rather than agreements.  This in turn made it incumbent on the 
negotiators to get rid of all the disagreements in order to have an agreed 
upon language to carry the process forward. (163)  
 
This subsequently happened during the next round of talks, held in Geneva 
form 2-5 August 1988, also dubbed as the final breakthrough on the road to 
lasting peace in Namibia.  The Geneva protocol was indeed very much 
rigorous in that it set the target dates for a conclusion of the peace process 
and the disengagement of all opposing forces. (164)  By 22 December 1988, a 
tri-partite peace agreement was signed between Angola, South Africa and 
Cuba, setting 1 April 1989, as the target date for the implementation of the 
Namibian peace plan. (165) 
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Given Pretoria’s past record of unilaterally brushing aside agreed upon 
decisions and resolutions, a climate of scepticism however, remained.  As   1 
April 1989 was drawing closer the obvious scepticism of the Namibian 
populace and the International Community was confirmed.  A battle broke 
out between the PLAN Combatants and SADF/Koevoet forces in the north 
at Endola, approximately 25 kilometres south of the Angolan border.  The 
situation deteriorated to such an extent that the peace process appeared to be 
in the balance.  Pretoria accused SWAPO of infiltrating into Namibia in 
violation of the established stipulations of the peace plan, aimed at taking 
power by force.  According to Theo-Ben Gurirab, the then SWAPO 
Secretary for Foreign Affairs, the PLAN combatants were in Namibia from 
where they had been fighting the war for the past twenty two years.  He 
further maintained that in accordance with the letter and spirit of the UNSC 
resolution 435 of 1978 the PLAN combatants inside Namibia were in fact 
entitled to be confined to base by UNTAG.  Furthermore, taking into 
account the Geneva Protocol signed on 5 August 1988, no reference is made 
about the PLAN combatants in Namibia at the time of the cease-fire.  The 
protocol only made reference to those forces that would be north of the 
Namibian border.  Unfortunately, UNTAG was not yet deployed by 1 April 
1989.  It did not have any structures in place in the north of Namibia.  This 
was the last major ditch attempt by apartheid Pretoria to derail the whole 
peace process in Namibia. (166) 
 
In conclusion, this study submits that the SADF/SWATF military 
intelligence had advance knowledge of the presence of the PLAN 
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combatants inside Namibia and took advantage of the situation to create a 
crisis aimed at wrecking the whole process.  According to ballistic expert 
evidence, the PLAN combatants were rounded up by the SADF/Koevoet 
forces and cold-bloodily shot at point blank range from the back.  “They 
were executed from the back”, stated one of the international ballistic 
experts who conducted a post-mortem analysis. (167)  
 
A further complication and indeed a deliberate machination was that the UN 
had only a 783-member peacekeeping force, comprising military and 
civilian personnel in Namibia at that time in point, instead of the 4 650 
authorized forces.  Talking with the benefit of hindsight, in terms of the 
proposals made regarding the DMZ agreed to by SWAPO, Angola, South 
Africa and Zambia by 1980 it was found once again that these agreements 
and accords made no reference whatsoever, to the PLAN fighters inside 
Namibia.  As a matter of fact, it is not clear what the sentence, “SWAPO 
would be excluded from the selected locations” implied? For example the 
temporary exempted sites within the 50 kilometre wide DMZ on either sides 
of the border.  In any event, the DMZ however, was expected to become 
effective within fourteen days after the formal cease-fire.  Moreover, it 
should be remembered that SWAPO had in fact declared a unilateral cease-
fire nine days after the signature of the Geneva protocol.  Based on the 
arguments advanced above, it appeared that Pretoria’s repeated claims that 
SWAPO had violated the agreement, which became effective at 04h00 on  
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1 April 1989 had been baseless and another sinister attempt to derail whole 
implementation process. (168) 
 
In addition, no documentary evidence was presented by Pretoria to 
substantiate its claims of violations.  There was also no evidence presented 
that  the PLAN combatants were not entitled to reassemble at bases inside 
Namibia and that these forces should have been redeployed north of the 16th 
parallel at the time of cease-fire.  As a matter of fact most of the evidence 
found at the scene of fighting, as well as eyewitness accounts suggested that 
it was indeed the SADF/Koevoet forces that provoked the fighting. (169) 
 
Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the fighting attempts to get this crucial 
exercise back on track had been more vigorous.  It surpassed mere political 
psychology for military gains aimed at securing an honourable exit form 
Namibia.  By 8 April 1989, a high-level delegation from the five nations of 
the JMC, comprising the Angolan delegation led by Lt.-Gen. Antonio dos 
Santos Franco, Deputy Minister of Defence, the Cuban delegation led by 
Carlos Aldana, the South African delegation led by R. F. Botha, then 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, the US delegation led by Dr. Chester Crocker, 
Assistant Security of State for African Affairs, and the Soviet delegation led 
by Anatoly Adamashin, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, met at Mount 
Etjo in Namibia.  This meeting had the sole objective of revitalizing the 
peace exercise as Namibia teetered on the brink of an all-out war.  Pretoria 
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still holding on to its claims of SWAPO violations of the peace process 
threatened a de facto suspension of the implementation process, thereby 
asserting onto itself the right of ordering the UN out of Namibia.  This 
however, did not come as a surprise considering Pretoria’s half-heartedness 
at implementing the UN’s peace plan for Namibia.  Furthermore, it was 
inconceivable on what legal grounds a regime that was on numerous 
occasions declared illegal in Namibia could assert onto itself the right to 
expel the UNO out of Namibia. (170) 
 
As the Mount Etjo talks commenced, Pretoria pressed ahead with a new set 
of claims and allegations.  It alleged that there were as many as 1 800 PLAN 
fighters inside Namibia involved in heavy fighting.  In addition, it claimed 
that there was a further 1 300 “insurgents” just north of the border preparing 
to infiltrate.  These unsubstantiated claims and accusations however, did not 
surprised anybody, given Pretoria’s obstructionist posture vis-à-vis the peace 
plan.  Moreover, South Africa even after the final agreements were reached 
at the Mount Etjo talks attempted to take control of the exercise by 
announcing that the assembly points inside Namibia would be jointly 
manned by the SADF/SWATF forces and UNTAG. By 11 April 1989, 
Pretoria issued a statement, announcing that the UN had agreed to the 
interrogation of the PLAN combatants, as a means to determine the number 
of those wounded as well as, to ascertain their whereabouts and to identify 
positions of weapons caches. (171) 
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South Africa, further stepped-up its attempts aimed at either derailing, or 
otherwise bringing the whole exercise to a halt.  Prominent amongst these 
were its refusal to release political prisoners who should have had been set 
free by 1 April 1989.  In this respect, Pretoria indicated that as far as it was 
concerned there were no political prisoners held by it, but criminals instead.  
The AG further maintained that, those awaiting trial would not be released, 
and that prosecutions would continue as normal during the implementation 
period. (172) In the final analysis, Washington, worried about its ally’s 
intransigence intervened aggressively to keep the process on pace.  
According to O’Neil and Munslow, global developments towards ending the 
Cold War were a precursor for setting the agenda and urgency for resolving 
regional conflicts.  In other words, whilst Pretoria’s policy of regional 
destabilisation carried out under its rubric of the “total strategy” provided a 
convenient ally to overall US policy of checkmating Soviet expansionism; it 
could not be allowed to challenge US hegemony in the region. (173)  Thus, 
reasserting US hegemony required curbing the influence of the military 
within Pretoria’s decision-making process and wrestling key elements of its 
regional policy, namely UNITA and Renamo away from Pretoria’s control.  
Anxious to score a success within its policy of “constructive engagement”  
the US did little, if any, to prevent Pretoria from being defeated at Cuito 
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Cuanavale, the final battle which paved the way for Namibia’s independence 
on 21 March 1990.  To summarize, a belated embracement of conventional 
diplomacy, which finally answers the question why independence for 
Namibia was agreed to a decade later? (174) 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
The struggle for independence and self-determination for Namibia has a 
long and protracted one.  After South Africa with the backing of the US 
backtracked on several opinions of the UN regarding its illegal occupation of 
Namibia, SWAPO decided to wage an armed struggle for the early 
independence of Namibia.  This decision was reinforced by the 1966 ruling 
of the ICJ.  Subsequent to the adoption of the UN resolution 435 of 1978, 
South Africa in tandem with Washington adopted an obstructionist posture 
by trumping-up issues that were irrelevant and unrelated to the settlement of 
the Namibian question.  The objective of the Washington-Pretoria alliance 
was to solve the Namibian question in their interests.  As soon as Reagan 
became president, the US position over Namibia became pro-South African. 
(175) 
 
 President Reagan interpreted all foreign policy matters in terms of global 
considerations of the US-Soviet rivalry.  The Reagan era reinforced support 
for South Africa, hostility toward African demands for self-determination  
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and obstructing the process for a peaceful settlement of the Namibian 
question. (176)  The US obstructionist and interventionist policies only waned 
with the signing of the historic Geneva peace accord, subsequent to  
stalemates in several war efforts, which had their own risks and economic 
costs, particularly the battle of Cuito Cuanavalle. (177) 
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4 THE SOVIET-CUBAN FACTOR 
4.1     Introduction 
The Soviet-Cuban intervention in southern Africa to assist liberation 
movements can be explained in different contexts, particularly when 
considering Cuba’s pre- and post-1959 foreign policy.  Cuba’s pre-1959 
foreign policy was carried out by a corrupt and firmly implanted group of 
politicians backed and encouraged by the US.  To the contrary, Cuba’s post-
1959 foreign policy changed dramatically both in shape and character with 
two important interconnected ideological components of national defense 
and internationalism. (178)  According to Hernandez, the US policy toward 
Cuba has greatly contributed to the identification of these two ideological 
components.  Since 1959 these have come to symbolize the revolutionary 
cause itself; the idea to do combat in another country for a just cause, 
especially  against foreign aggression. (179) 
 
The Soviet-Cuban interventionist missions in aid of liberation movements in 
Angola, Ethiopia and Congo triggered the US intervention in Southern 
Africa, the objective being to counter Soviet expansionism.  This stemmed 
from the political and ideological differences between the US and Cuba 
since the triumph of the latter’s revolution in 1959. (180)  This chapter aims to 
1) sketch impact on the region of the post-1959 Cuban polices versus US 
foreign polices, 2) the significance of the Soviet Cuban intervention in 
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Southern Africa and 3) the situation in Angola subsequent to the Cuban 
troop withdrawal.  
 
4.2     The Cuban Revolution versus the US foreign policies 
As already pointed out in the foregoing sections of this study exactly what 
the then Washington administration hoped not to happen took place right 
under its nose - the triumph of the Cuban revolution in 1959 led by President 
Fidel Castro Ruz.  This in fact signaled the end of an initial episode of 
collegial rule.  By 1960, four major watershed political changes took place 
on this Caribbean island.  These changes further helped to define and 
consolidate Cuba’s future political dispensation, which included amongst 
others: 
- the nationalization of US businesses and industries;  
 - the conclusion of a major trade agreement with the Soviets; 
 - the introduction of a military government backed by the militia and 
the CDR, and finally 
- the seizure of total control of the press and almost all types of 
organizations in existence then. (181) 
 
 
As expected these measures antagonized Washington that in turn responded 
by imposing an economic, social and political blockade of Cuba.  
Subsequent to the introduction of an egalitarian economic and social policy 
and, the freezing of prices and similar moves by President Fidel Castro Ruz, 
the US once again responded with yet tougher measures – the severance of 
diplomatic relations with Cuba.  It also by proxy of the CIA supported an 
_________________________________ 
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aborted attempt to overthrow President Castro Ruz’ newly installed 
revolutionary government.  As all these political developments were taking 
place Cuba appeared to have no alternative, but to switch its allegiance to 
the then Soviet Union.  This thesis submits that these were measures taken to 
counter the US sinister maneuvers as well as, to maintain its independence, 
given the height of the then Cold War. (182) 
 
By December 1961, President Castro Ruz made an epoch-making speech 
announcing publicly that he was a Marxist-Leninist.  This fact shaped the 
character and scope of  present-day Cuba.  It also at the same time signaled a 
dramatic shift in Cuba’s dependence from the US to the Soviet Union.  On 
the other hand, a new ally was conceived and especially so for the Third 
World countries, particularly Southern Africa. (183) 
 
By 1962, a major event took place that put the world on a threshold of an all 
out nuclear war – the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.  The CIA after having 
studied photographs taken by two US U-2 spy aircraft informed the then 
National Security adviser, George Bundy that the Soviets were constructing 
in Cuba sites for intermediate range missiles.  On 22 October 1962, at about 
19h00, President Kennedy went on national television announcing that there 
were nuclear sites in Cuba.  President Kennedy at the same time ordered a 
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naval blockade of Cuba to prevent the further delivery of nuclear warhead 
components and simultaneously demanded the dismantling of the missile 
sites and, the withdrawal of any and all missiles. (184)   
 
On 25 October 1962, while the military leaders of the US had a high-level 
meeting discussing air assaults aimed at destroying the Cuban Air force and 
missile sites, President Kennedy received a rambling emotional letter from 
the then Soviet Union leader, Nikita Khrushchev.  President Khrushchev’s 
letter informed that, if the US promised not to invade Cuba, “this would 
change everything…”.  The Kennedy administration believing that this was 
another stalling tactic by the Soviets aimed at buying time until all the 
missiles destined for Cuba were operational decided to apply more pressure. 
This led to an increase in the number of low-level reconnaissance flights 
over Cuba. (185) 
 
It should be noted that President Castro Ruz was not directly involved in the 
diplomatic maneuvers between the US and the then Soviet Union. 
Consequently, he viewed the increased low-level flights over Cuban national 
territory as a prelude to a US attack and ordered Cuban anti-aircraft batteries 
to open fire on any US aircraft over-flying Cuba.  President Castro Ruz 
simultaneously sent an astonishing bellicose message to President 
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Krushchev in which he estimated that the US was planning to invade Cuba 
“within three days”.  “You can be rest assured that we will firmly and 
resolutely resist attack”, President Castro Ruz concluded in his letter.  
President Castro Ruz further suggested that if the US invaded Cuba the 
Soviets should try and pre-empt its aircraft by unleashing a nuclear attack on 
US targets.  The Soviet Union, President Castro Ruz further wrote, “must 
never allow the circumstances in which the imperialist could launch the first 
nuclear strike against it”.  In the final analysis the probable nuclear 
confrontation, which gripped the entire globe for approximately a month was 
averted diplomatically.  How did this happen? (186) 
 
According to Robert McNamara, the then Secretary of Defence, each 
nation’s decisions immediately before and during the crisis had been 
distorted by misinformation, miscalculation and misjudgment.  As such, was 
the belief of the former Soviet Union and Cuba of the US intention to invade 
Cuba and overthrow President Castro Ruz and remove his government.  
Secondly, the US believed that at that point in time the Soviets would not 
move nuclear warheads outside Russia, which it in fact did.  Thirdly, the 
then Soviet Russian leaders believed that nuclear missiles could be secretly 
introduced and when their presence were disclosed the US would not 
respond, which indeed was a misjudgment.  Finally, the Washington security 
advisers who urged President Kennedy to strike first by an air attack were 
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almost certainly mistaken in their belief that the Soviets would not respond 
militarily elsewhere, thereby triggering a Third World War.  In this 
connection, what then was the purpose of introducing nuclear-tipped 
missiles into Cuba?  According to Andrey Gromyko, the former Soviet 
Foreign Minister, “it was a tactical strategy…their action was to strengthen 
the defense stability of Cuba… to avert threats against it”.  In other words, 
the defense of a strategic ally in the Western hemisphere given the then East-
West rivalry. (187) 
 
It is indeed against this backdrop that this study undertakes to analyze the 
circumstances under which Cuba became actively involved in the liberation 
politics of most other Third World nations, particularly Southern Africa. 
This is outlined in detail in the following section of this study.  Suffice to 
say, the consolidation of the Cuban revolution in the face of imperialist 
pressures obviously required promoting it elsewhere.  Besides, by the early 
1970s a dramatic shift in Cuba’s foreign policy affected its international 
relations as most Latin America Nations resumed diplomatic ties with Cuba. 
(188) 
 
It should be noted that Cuba’s post-1970 political program, as guided by its 
internationalist foreign policy brand linking historical developments to the 
on-going national and international social class struggles impacted 
tremendously upon Africa.  This was even so in Southern Africa.  This thesis 
submits that this would not have been possible without the socialist 
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solidarity from the then Soviet Union and other socialist countries that 
helped to defend Cuba militarily and sustained it economically.  Moreover, 
Cuba’s changing strategies then reflected a change in its own political and 
socio-economic realities that were almost comparable to whatever Third 
World nation in the face of capitalist-imperialist onslaught.  Therefore, the 
world’s changing realities, this study further submits provided a catalyst for 
Cuba’s international political and military strategies.  In addition, Cuba’s 
foreign policy strategies as complimented by an improving economic 
situation during the 1970s were based on a newly created global outlook 
rather than mere ideology per se.  It would therefore be wrong to assert that 
Cuba’s African policy was based on an opportunistic change of scenery as 
most scholars of political studies from the right would want to argue. (189)  
During the 45th anniversary of Labor Day, President Castro Ruz consolidated 
this assumption when he hailed Cuba’s revolutionary diplomacy at 
unnerving the West’s hypocrisy and cynicism used to preserve a rotten 
system of global political and economic domination. (190) 
 
As a matter of fact, Cuba had been heavily involved in Africa during most of 
the 1970s.  Needless to say, during the 1960s President Castro Ruz sent his 
trusted lieutenant, Ernesto Che Guevara to eastern Congo to assist Laurent 
Kabila and the Lumumbist rebels in their war efforts against the Belgian 
colonialist.  This subsequently burst into a revolutionary wave, which  
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simultaneously provoked the then Washington administration’s harsh 
responses, heralding a new interventionist era under President Ronald 
Reagan.  Against this backdrop, it should be remembered that it was Cuba’s 
post-1959 foreign policy objectives that bottle-necked its bilateral relations 
with the US.  Another strain for example, was Cuba’s globalist objectives, 
which per se are expressions of its own world vision emanating from its own 
peculiar internal social order, which is then projected on an international 
scale.  Under the Reagan administration, the earlier days of Western 
politicking returned with a vengeance.  Moreover, the US-Cuba negotiating 
positions at that point in time had changed over the years, while the source 
remained constant.  For Cuba, the most central issue in its relations with the 
US before any meaningful negotiations could take place was, and is: 
- the lifting of the economic, social and political embargo, and all 
other forms of commercial pressure; 
- the cessation of all forms of subversive acts; 
- the cessation of pirate attacks form the US  bases and elsewhere; 
- the cessation of violating Cuba’s air and naval space as well as, the 
return of the Guantanamo naval base to Cuba. (191) 
 
 
For the Federal Government of the US the most critical issues include 
amongst others: 
- financial compensation for nationalized US property; 
- the issue of human rights; 
- cessation in participating in any kind of violence in the Western 
hemisphere; 
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- the removal of all troops from Angola, and the 
- termination of Cuba’s close association with the then Soviet 
Union. (192) 
 
Given the demands and conditionalities of the US, particularly in respect of 
the Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola it became pertinent that it was 
Cuba’s policy objectives, to be engaged internationally in order to offset US 
enmity.  Cuba in fact, achieved this objective with sterling results thereby 
neutralizing some negative aspects of the US anti-Cuban policies.  
Furthermore, Cuba at the same time succeeded in avoiding being isolated 
from the international political playground.  Cuba’s motivation to lend more 
allegiance to the former Soviet Union could also be explained in part on 
Washington’s policies since the triumph of the Cuban revolution. (193)   
 
In any event, it was Cuba’s desired objective to export its revolution, thereby 
simultaneously challenging the US military and political influence the world 
over.  The US response in return was to contain Cuba as was evidenced 
during the Angolan conflict where we came to find the linkage of Namibia’s 
independence to Cuban troop withdrawal from that territory.  For 
Washington, if Cuba could be immobilized in international affairs, its 
socialist government could become more palatable to the extent that the US 
could live with it.  This was a similar policy approach adopted in respect of 
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apartheid South Africa.  Although critical of South Africa’s apartheid 
policies the US in collusion with Britain continued to shield the then white 
minority regime in the UNSC using their controversial veto rights. 
Therefore, the major obstacle in the US-Cuba relations within the context of 
Southern Africa was Cuba’s support for national liberation movements in 
the region.  Cuba supported the MPLA, SWAPO and the ANC, amongst 
others. (194) 
  
As pointed out in the foregoing sections of this study the then Washington 
administrations did not have clear strategy directions on Southern Africa.  
This study submits that this was so, given their preconceived assumptions 
that the region’s white redoubts, comprising Angola,  Mozambique, 
Namibia, the then Rhodesia and South Africa were secured.  Thus, they 
entertained the idea that there was little or no significant Soviet involvement 
in the region that were likely to threaten the US relatively insignificant 
interests by then.  Nonetheless, these assumptions just proved the contrary 
following the granting of independence by Portugal to its former colonies, 
commencing in 1975.  This chain of events heavily impacted on the US 
policies for this region thereby forcing its policy architects to revisit, 
reassess and redefine America’s significant interests in the Southern African 
region as they were falling by the way-side.  At this point in time, few of the 
US policy makers expected that the conflict in this region could escalate into 
a major international crisis. (195)  
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The US government following the Vietnam disaster only came to realize that 
the political playing field in the sub-region had been leveled in favor of the 
then Soviet-Cuban alliance. This encouraged its policy architects to take a 
hard look at the unfolding political landscape in Southern Africa, which 
heralded a major redefinition of the region’s significance.  In the wake of its 
political and to some extent military set-backs in south-east Asia, the US 
government decided to capitalize on the situation in Angola. It did this to 
demonstrate that it still had the resolve to act as a superpower.  It must be 
added that the US security and foreign policy approaches had been very 
much self-centered, thereby viewing most parts of the Third World, 
particularly Southern Africa with its rich strategic mineral resources for the 
West’s industries, as mere markets and targets. (196) 
 
4.3 Significance of the Soviet-Cuban intervention in Southern Africa 
Soviet-Cuban intervention in Africa, particularly Southern Africa dates back 
to the early 1960s.  For example, after independence from Belgium  in 1960, 
the then Zaire became the Cold War battleground fought over by rebels and 
mercenaries, CIA agents and the Cuban troops.  It is submitted that US, 
driven primarily by security concerns often oscillated between on the one 
hand, intervention to prevent a rival from gaining a foothold and on the other 
neglect when the threat passed.  The US Southern African interventionist 
posture however, was never to be. (197)     
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By 1965, the legendary Ernesto Che Guevara slipped into the then Zaire 
with a group of black Cuban fighters to join the pro-Soviet rebels led by 
Desiree Laurant Kabila and the Lubumbumists.  A CIA agent in Kishahsha 
warned of an imminent Communist take-over with far-reaching 
consequences.  With the Portuguese colonial administration ceding control 
to nationalist movements in all territories under its control the US responded 
by availing assistance to rivals of these movements to counter Soviet 
expansionism (198)  
 
Cuba resolved to send troops to Angola on the request of Dr. Antonio 
Agostinho Neto.  Cuba’s earlier military involvement in Angola however, 
had been limited to advisers and training personnel.  It is therefore, only on 
the desperate request of the then Angolan leader following intelligence 
reports that the US was aiding Holden Alvaro Roberto’s FNLA financially, 
and militarily with the assistance of the CIA that Cuba started its 
introduction and deployment of troops in Angola.  This was indeed 
incremental and at the same time followed a fast pace.  From initially 82 
officers the number had already reached 4 000 by 7 November 1975.  For 
Cuba, given its post-1959 policy differences with the US, Angola 
represented a major victory for its African policies. This principled and 
tactical move further enhanced its Third World leadership objectives and 
________________________________ 
197. O’Neil, K & Munslow, B 1990. Ending the cold war in Southern Africa. (Special issue). Third World Quarterly 12. 3/4. 10.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 108
liberation status that were indeed very much significant.  The reversal of this 
triumph as was evidenced in the foregoing sections of this study became a 
major US policy objective.  Suffice to say, the successes of which was 
indeed achieved with the linkage of Namibia’s independence to Cuban troop 
withdrawal from Angola.  What then were Cuba’s major victories and 
setbacks, following its involvement in Africa, especially Southern Africa? 
(199) 
 
With its involvement in the Southern African region, Cuba highlighted its 
long held campaign – calling for a new world order based on mutual 
understanding and equality.  Cuba indeed succeeded in fostering a natural 
bond of alliances with other Third World nations. This was especially so 
with those developing nations facing economic and political confrontation 
with the market economy nations.  This objective in particular, although 
there appeared to have been some differences of opinion however, 
insignificant, amongst the Third World countries, gained tremendous 
momentum and credibility.   Cuba also prompted some Third World nations 
following the Reagan administration’s interventionist policies in Africa to 
re-examine their relationships with it.  This in fact was and is evident from 
the tremendous support Cuba obtained from these countries on resolutions 
manufactured against it in the UNGA, pertaining to the US decades old 
economic, social and political embargo.  Cuba, at the same time managed to  
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shift international focus from East-West rivalry to that of the powerful north 
and hungry south issues. (200)   
 
Following its activities in Angola in concert with its major ally, the then 
Soviet Union, Cuba also helped to put the question of Namibia’s 
independence high on the agenda of the UNSC.   It became not just an issue 
of independence, but instead an issue of decolonization in accordance with 
the Convention of Nations. (201) 
 
 
4.4 Angola after the Cuban troop withdrawal 
 
Although the Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola was completed by 1991, 
twenty-four months after the implementation of the UNSC resolution 435 of 
1978, peace in Angola then was still remote.  This came as a major setback 
for Cuba, particularly when considering the military situation in Angola 
then.  Obviously, it was a policy objective that was not brought to its logical 
conclusion.  Following the cease-fire accord signed by the US, Portugal and 
the then Soviet Union by May 1991, at Estoril paving the way for peace in 
Angola, and the subsequent presidential and legislative elections defeat of 
UNITA during the 29-30 September 1992, heavy fighting erupted that 
almost paralysed the entire country.  Dr. Jonas Malhero Savimbi, the since 
late leader of UNITA cried foul, claiming that the elections were rigged in 
favour of the incumbent President of Angola, Jose Eduardo dos Santos and 
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and took to the bush to restart an all-out civil war.  According to the UNSR 
in Angola, Dr. Alioune Blondin Beye, the since late Malian diplomat, the 
elections contrary to Dr. Savimbi’s alleged claims of rigging had been 
generally “free and fair”.  Such were the opinions of other international 
observers.  In its resolution 864 of September 1993, the UN responded to the 
late Dr. Savimbi’s intransigence by imposing an arms and fuel embargo. (202) 
 
 
It is in fact worth noting that the US at this point maintained a low profile 
against its former war client.  Having been UNITA’s military and financial 
mainstay alongside apartheid South African and the Zairian regimes, this 
study submits that the US could have used its influence of persuasion over 
UNITA and brought Dr. Savimbi to terms with the demands and norms of 
democracy.  Yet, the US failed to do so in spite of the loss of hundreds of 
thousands of lives and property as a result of the conflict.  In addition, 
apartheid South Africa attempting to take advantage of the void left by the 
Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola under the pretext of mediating in the 
Angolan conflict, aided UNITA.  Consequently, the Angola authorities 
declared the then Foreign Minister of South Africa, R. F.  Botha, a persona 
non grata. This represented a major diplomatic blow to the government of 
President F. W. de Klerk.  This study further submits that President De 
Klerk sought to use mediation in the Angolan conflict as a diplomatic 
instrument to advance his efforts aimed at bolstering South Africa’s 
tarnished image, both at home and abroad. (203) 
_________________________________________________________ 
202. New African. 2004. June: 16-17 
203. Ibid., 17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 111
In yet another calculated move aimed at gaining political mileage thereby 
bolstering Pretoria’s standing, President De Klerk’s regime proposed to host 
and chair future talks between the warring parties of Angola.  Ironically, this 
campaign came at a time when Angola had not only declared the regime’s 
Foreign Minister an unwanted person in its territory, but also making it 
public that the regime was sending plane-loads of weaponry and other 
logistical materials to UNITA.  Thus, the then apartheid regime’s mission 
was clear, this thesis wishes to submit, to win for UNITA what it had failed 
to win in the presidential and legislative elections. (204) 
 
 
Pretoria, under the prodding of the US still in a diplomatic shuttle in the 
Angolan jigsaw, again proposed a so-called African solution, which came to 
mean a power-sharing arrangement with UNITA.   South Africa had by then 
drafted a document which suggested that for every MPLA Minister, there 
should be a UNITA Deputy Minister, and vice versa.  In its essence this had 
been the approach of successive South African administrations to the 
concept of power-sharing and perhaps the main reason for the impasse in its 
internal politics.  In the final analysis, such an arrangement would defeat the 
essence of democracy   by all its definitions as democracy is about choices 
and not imposed political arrangements.  Besides, the Angolan nation made 
their choices during the 29-30 September 1992 presidential and legislative 
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elections.  What in fact aroused scepticism was that the US administration, 
the main protagonist of democracy appeared to have taken serious pains at 
pointing a finger against the aggressor.  Unfortunately so, the UN also 
seemed to have echoed the same sentiments.  This study submits that the US 
should have abandoned its quiet diplomacy strategy and publicly condemned 
UNITA. (205) 
 
 
For approximately thirty-five months after the departure of the Cuban 
internationalist forces from Angolan territory, the UNSR had been arm-
twisting negotiators from both sides in Lusaka, the capital of neighbouring 
Zambia.  For eleven months, with fierce fighting raging in Angola, the only 
thing to come out of Lusaka had been acrimony and disappointment.  By 17 
October 1994, Dr. Blondin Beye, the UNSR in Angola announced that the 
belligerents had “agreed in principle” to a peace deal, namely the Lusaka 
Protocol.  “Peace in Angola is within our reach”, Dr. Blondin Beye later 
declared.  In any event, given the above-captured observations these should 
serve as lessons learned mindful of Angola’s recent political history that 
should be viewed as a model of how not to attempt to manage African 
politics.  Both rivals had their Cold War patrons, these being the then Soviet-
Cuban alliance, siding with MPLA and the US, South Africa and Zaire on 
the side of Dr. Jonas Malheiro Savimbi’s UNITA and Holden Alvaro 
Roberto’s FNLA. (206) 
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As that war faded, a cease-fire was arranged and the subsequent elections 
meant to consolidate the prospect for lasting peace in Angola.  However, this 
failed to hold because Dr. Savimbi lost the vote.  It is in fact justified to 
conclude that if Dr. Savimbi as pointed out in the foregoing sections of this 
study could have been induced with the proper treatment he might in all 
likelihood have accepted defeat, almost quietly.  Dr. Savimbi did not get that 
and took to the bush.  Given this, it became almost certain that Dr. Savimbi’s 
intransigence was borne out of the West, in particular the USA’s 
unwillingness to flex its muscles in order to muzzle this wayward 
personality’s mischievous and dangerous ways.  What then would be the 
prospects for lasting peace in Angola? (207)  
 
Obviously negotiations and subsequent power-sharing based on proportional 
representation as per the Lusaka Protocol appeared to be the only way out in 
the interim.  But once again, how does one determine the political will and 
mechanisms of such an arrangement? (208)  According to Dr. Blodin Beye, the 
sides had agreed how to share-out power.  Following these arrangements: 
- UNITA will run four Ministries, including the country’s important 
Ministry of Geology and Mines and will have seven deputy 
ministerships, governorship of three provinces, several 
ambassadorships and control of the Cuando Cubango, Kwanza Norte 
and Uige provinces and some municipalities.  The presidency would 
be subjected to a new vote. (209) 
_________________________________ 
 
207. New African. 2004. June: 16 
208. Ibid., 16 
209. BBC Focus on Africa 2002. April-June: 11-13 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 114
However, under the 1992 peace deal signed at Estoril in Portugal, President 
Dos Santos ought to have contested a second round after winning more votes 
than UNITA’s Dr. Savimbi.  Nonetheless, the second round was abandoned 
after Dr. Savimbi cried foul and went to war.  President Dos Santos despite 
this setback won recognition abroad, most notably from the US. The US at 
this point after a long period of silent diplomacy appeared to have had a 
change of heart and were willing to engage the path of creative and daring 
political solutions for the decades-old civil conflagration in this southern 
African nation.  For Cuba, a staunch Cold-War ally this indeed signalled a 
major diplomatic and political victory.  Moreover, the deal was less than 
what Dr. Savimbi hoped for.  It should be remembered that UNITA had long 
demanded the governorship of the Huambo province, its military base and 
political heartland.  UNITA however, had dropped that demand not out of 
goodwill, but rather because of the pressures the MPLA and South Africa 
exerted on it. (210) 
 
 
As the world community was watching the new wave of the Angolan civil 
war escalating into unprecedented proportions, FAPLA, backed by aircraft 
turfed UNITA out of one town after another to such an extent that it was also 
in a position to launch attacks on Huambo itself.  The MPLA government 
only relented from doing so mainly because of pressures from the US, 
Portugal and Russia, the principal observers of the peace process. 
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Aided by the political changes that were taking shape in the sub-region 
following the waning of the Cold War, obviously the warring parties had to 
put more reason at work.  Thus, diplomacy and political tolerance had to be 
tested once again.  Therefore, the unpalatable evils of racial, ethnic and 
ideological polarization and strife, economic backwardness, national 
disunity and disintegration, had to make way for more acceptable concepts.  
These were democracy and national reconciliation, which appeared to have 
been realized with the 4 April 2002- Luena Peace Accords as an addendum 
to the 1992 Lusaka Protocol, ushering in the watershed end of the almost 
three decades of civil conflagration in Angola. (211) 
 
Meanwhile, Cuba followed the turn of events with keen interests following 
its withdrawal from that territory and at the same time witnessed the shifting 
of the balance of power in favour of its Cold War ally.  Obviously, a new 
political strategy for them became imminent.  Thus, a focus on the home 
front mindful of the collapse of the then Soviet Union.  It is very important 
to note that Cuba’s domestic economic crisis could partly be blamed on the 
US more than three decades old economic, social and political embargo.  As 
it stands, part of this crisis was home manufactured and only came to impact 
tremendously on Cuba’s domestic economy after the collapse of the former 
Soviet Union. Internal factors such as mismanagement, corrupt government  
officials and a highly centralized and bloated bureaucracy compounded by 
the US economic blockade surfaced in the early 1990s. (212) 
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Naturally, the US blockade of Cuba had been more than just economic as it 
also extended to the diplomatic, military and cultural spheres.  For that 
reason, for more than three decades Cuba had been brutally denied the most 
basic principles of peaceful co-existence of human civilizations stemming 
from its orthodox Marxist-Leninist principles of governance. (213) 
 
As a matter of fact, Cuba’s major post-1959 foreign policy problem in the 
Western hemisphere had been its bilateral ties with the US.  Once the 
withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola was completed one would have 
expected that Washington would soften its stance against this island nation 
of twelve million people.  However, it was just the contrary.  In any event, it 
is agreed that there would be a continuous disagreement with regard to the 
system of apartheid in the then South Africa and other regional issues, but 
this would be of relatively minor significance in terms of the US-Cuba 
bilateral relationship.  Furthermore, considering the productive diplomatic 
relations that was put in place as evidenced in the negotiations that finally 
led to the Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola and the subsequent 
independence of Namibia, it could be concluded that the foundations were 
laid for a spill-over into other areas as well. (214) 
 
 
Notwithstanding this, it was absolutely incumbent and dependent on the 
leaders of both the US and Cuba to realize that at least a settlement was 
reached in respect of the Angola-Namibian questions based on each side’s 
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common sense and willingness to abandon ideological posturing. Therefore, 
recognition of the legitimacy of each side’s interests and concerns would 
suffice.  When asked about the dangers facing Cuba in a post-Cold War free 
world, President Castro Ruz stressed the US economic and diplomatic 
embargo. In other words, and given the demands for change in Cuba from 
eight consecutive Washington administrations before meaningful 
negotiations could take place, it appeared then and even now that President 
Castro Ruz was not about to help matters. For example, by announcing 
“free” elections in which he is certain to walk out victorious, given Cuba’s 
principled stance on independence and non-interference in its domestic 
policies.  For the record, this is indeed evidenced from the statements made 
by the then youthful Cuban Minister of Foreign Affairs, Roberto Robaina 
Gonzalez at various UNGA meetings that Cuba would never negotiate its 
sovereignty and socialism.  Besides, how does Washington intend 
pressurizing Cuba given the fact that the Cold War was long gone?  
Ironically, Washington eased and even lifted its embargo on a host of Cold 
War adversaries, including Vietnam.  Needles to mention the US had no 
problem whatsoever with Portugal being a one-party fascist state until 1974, 
in NATO (215) 
 
 
The Clinton administration it is noted was of opinion that trade and not 
confrontation was the policy towards China, another major bastion of 
communism despite reports of its alleged human rights abuses.  At close 
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scrutiny, one finds that these were the same allegations levelled against 
Cuba.  Now should the same logic not be applicable to that country as well? 
(216)  Instead of easing the embargo of this island nation Washington’s 
response had been to tighten it.  As a pointer to that effect Washington by 
December 1992, passed the CDA, which also came to be popularly known 
as the Torricelli Bill.  The Act, was in every definition an up-to-date version 
of the decades old US blockade of Cuba.  It in effect provided for an 
increase in communication, academic contacts and humanitarian aid.  The 
main thrust however, had been to extend the embargo to US subsidiaries 
abroad. (217) 
 
 
As it stands now, the uncompromising stance continues on both sides.  Some 
US administration officials responsible for foreign policy strategies towards 
Cuba then argued that to ease up on Cuba would be tantamount to rewarding 
dictatorship.  Further assertions were that unlike China and Vietnam there 
were no serious signals of reform in Cuba despite the changes in 
contemporary global politics.  Nevertheless, the Clinton administration 
unlike its predecessors had not gone out of its way to antagonize Cuba given 
the enormous support for Cuba from Third World countries.  On the other 
hand, it equally appeared that Washington was neither contemplating a 
change in its embargo policy, the most contending factor in its relationship 
with its immediate Caribbean neighbour.  It was and is in fact evident that 
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this embargo policy was leading the US on a lone path insofar as Cuba was 
concerned on a multi-lateral level.  The US embargo of Cuba had been 
overwhelmingly condemned in the UNGA in both 1992 and 1993, and 
continued to be condemned at every occasion possible.  Given these 
observations, this thesis submits that the worst affront to the US foreign 
policy, was President Fidel Castro Ruz still holding on to absolute power for 
decades in the face of the collapse of the former Soviet Union. (218) 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
Soviet-Cuban intervention in aid of liberation movements impacted 
tremendously on the nature and scope of the political landscape in the 
region.  Although positive in most respects there however, had also been 
negative ramifications stemming from the US policy machinations triggered 
by its over-zealous obsession of containing Soviet expansionism. (219) 
 
The US policy impacts in Southern Africa relative to the Soviet-Cuban 
intervention became most emphasized during the 1970s.  Suffice to say, 
Cuba’s post-1970 political program guided by its internationalist policy 
brand, linking historical developments to the on-going national and 
international class struggles impacted heavily on Africa.  This became even 
more pronounced with the socialist solidarity from the then Soviet Union 
that helped to defend Cuba militarily and sustain it economically.  Cuba’s 
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post-1970 strategies reflected a change in its own political and socio-
economic realities that were almost comparable to whatever Third World 
country in the face of capitalist-imperialist onslaught. (220) 
 
As Portugal ceded control of Luanda to the MPLA in 1975 it immediately 
called for the complete decolonization of Africa.  The MPLA further 
proclaimed its support for liberation movements in the sub-region and 
provided shelter and military assistance to SWAPO and the ANC.  As a 
result of constant destabilizing acts carried out by Kinshasha, Pretoria and 
UNITA, the MPLA requested and received assistance from the Soviet-
Cuban alliance, the latter introducing multiple numbers of troops into that 
country in a short period. This triggered the determined intervention of the 
US in the region driven by its Cold War psychosis. (221) 
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5. Conclusion 
 
There are various and distinct opinions on how the US foreign policy 
evolved towards most Third World nations, particularly Southern Africa.  It 
is submitted and with explicit reference to the then conflicts in Angola, 
Namibia and South Africa, although different in character and scope, that the 
US foreign and security policy premises had been to manufacture these 
conflicts. With hindsight, the policy premises had always been a clear 
depiction of the overall collusion of colonial exploitation that founded 
economic systems that prospered in ways that eventually attracted untold 
millions of free immigrants from Europe.  These conflicts sustained the 
West so that it could attain the living standards and supremacy it came to 
enjoy in the last two centuries.  Therefore, the argument that these civil wars 
at times conveniently labelled by the Western media as black-on-black 
violence were imposed on these countries.  At the height of the Cold War, 
Southern Africa became the epicentre of East-West rivalry. (222) 
 
 
With the emergence of the so-called “new world order” and “constructive 
engagement” enunciated by President Ronald Reagan we came to witness 
the projection of an old American nostalgia – America First.  It should be 
noted that this concept was embraced by a motley crew of Americans using 
it for vastly different ends.  For example, it was used by an aviation pioneer, 
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Charles Lindenbergh, in a bid to keep the US out of World War II.  At 
present it has come to mean the US national interests. (223)   Rice corroborated 
this assumption when acknowledging that the US found it extremely 
difficult to define its national interests in the absence of Soviet power.  The 
former Soviet Union was perceived as more than just a traditional global 
competitor; it strove to lead a universal socialist alternative to markets and 
democracy.  The inference here is that the US national interest should take 
precedence over issues such as human rights, justice and equality, which 
indeed is in contradiction to the very same principles and values of a 
democratic system.  (224) 
 
 
These were the very same sentiments reflected in a major televised interview 
of President Ronald Reagan, by March 1981, in which he described 
apartheid South Africa, its major ally in fomenting conflicts in the sub-
region, as a “friendly country that strategically is essential to the free world 
in its production of minerals that we must all have”. (225)  Needless to say, in 
the conception of the US planners of the modern world after 1945, the Third 
World was to function as a source of raw materials and as a market.  As a 
consequence the US used its unchallenged military muscle to strengthen its 
relative economic position. (226) 
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Conversely, the Reagan administration concentrated more on white opinion, 
when a strategy of black empowerment defined as dialogue with the black 
leadership would have been more encompassing.  It did not have a coherent 
and sustainable policy towards Southern Africa.  It did not have the ability to 
deal resolutely and effectively with apartheid Pretoria.  Southern Africa has 
always been a difficult terrain for US policymakers.  Urnov argues that 
whatever policy the West put forward for Southern Africa, the interests of 
Pretoria were given maximum consideration. (227)  Over the last three 
decades, Republican and Democratic officials alike have repeatedly 
miscalculated the stability of white rule in Southern Africa and the strength 
of black resistance.  In addition, they did so likewise in terms of the 
significance of Soviet-Cuban involvement in the region with equally 
damaging consequences. (228)  Lewis corroborated this when observing that 
over the last three decades, strategies formulated to dealt with turbulence in 
the Third World have followed no fixed pattern.  Trial and error have 
produced a wide array of inconsistent policies and errors, revealing flawed 
strategies during the Nixon, Carter and Reagan-Bush presidencies. (229) 
 
 
In their efforts to promote political change in the region, consecutive US 
administrations tended to rely too much on quiet diplomacy and so-called 
positive measures.  When these failed it switched to strategies that 
emphasized pressure and isolation.  It is submitted that both approaches have 
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been tried several times and each time they have failed to produce tangible 
results.  As one approach fell into disfavour the other was revived and the 
cycle started anew.  As pointed out in the foregoing sections of this study, 
President Reagan’s remarks on South Africa have often exhibited a 
perception that his views differ from those of his advisers.  This has been the 
case on a number of occasions on questions regarding the significance of the 
South African reform initiatives, the causes of black unrest and the right of 
the South African military to attack facilities in neighbouring states at will. 
(230) 
 
 
The America First concept as exemplified in a statement made by Patrick 
Buchanan, a 1994-Republican presidential candidate was a clear 
manifestation of the US view of geo-politics as opposed to human rights and 
peaceful co-existence.  Besides, these were and are the views that constituted 
the bottom-line of the US foreign policy tradition. (231)    According to Mead, 
a senior fellow in US Foreign Policy at the Council of Foreign Relations, it 
was no accident that the country’s early leaders devoted so much attention to 
foreign policy.  The prosperity and happiness of the typical American family 
were closely tied to international affairs and the connection was lost neither 
on the voters, nor on those who hoped to win their support.  Suffice to say, 
the US domestic policy resolve had been, and are, inextricably linked to its 
foreign and security policy objectives. (232) 
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This, the argument is advanced in fact is a policy tradition that reflected the 
US fear of a global equalitarian society, as reflected in Cuba’s post-1959 
African policy, hence the diplomatic and political animosity with its 
Caribbean neighbour. This was further aggravated by the latter’s active 
involvement and alliances with Africa’s liberation movements.  Further 
evidence towards this end can be traced in Dr. Chester Crocker’s 
Memorandum of 1981 in which he stated that: 
the US has lost an important influence over  South Africa due to our 
lack of perception towards the dynamic changes in South Africa.  
Sometimes it was a mistake, to believe that the watches of South Africa 
and the US were synchronized at the same time.  It is evident that to 
stimulate South Africa to decide its own future would benefit the 
interest of the US. (233) 
 
 
 
In the final analysis and based on these observations white supremacy driven 
by corporate America in collusion with apartheid South Africa and other 
white redoubts, had to be preserved at all costs.  It was the perception that 
such a strategy at the same time would serve the US essential economic, 
political and strategic interests in the region.  In this context, consecutive US 
governments therefore took an active role in opening up Africa and Asia to 
American trade.  Reminiscent of the US traditional imperialist objectives as 
America spread out across the world in search for profits, diplomats 
followed suit to reinforce those objectives.  What really was at issue here, 
one can conveniently conclude were national interests, but whose national 
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interests?  Obviously the interests of a selected elite as per the dictates of 
capitalist-imperialist motives spearheaded by corporate America that for 
decades had been the driving force of the US domestic, security and foreign 
policies.  Unfortunately, given its global definition the concept national 
interests in the US took a beating.  Ever since the 1960s, several US 
administrations invoke the concept national interests, when what really 
mattered were the political and economic interests of the administration of 
the day, for instance, President Reagan’s limitless obsession to checkmate 
Soviet expansionism in Southern Africa. (234)  Urnov observes that the US 
support for colonial liberation movements had been subordinate to its 
opposition to the former Soviet Union during its “roll back Communism” 
campaign.  Those on the wrong end suffered the consequences.  The sharp 
edge of the Washington-Pretoria alliance directed primarily against Angola 
is a case in point.  Too rarely has the concept national interests been used 
within its proper context - the interest of a global community. (235) 
 
 
It must, however, be admitted that not only did the US prevail in the then 
Cold-War, but it also ensured the spread of its language, culture and 
products world-wide.  The American currency became the international 
medium of finance; English became the lingua franca of global business;  
American culture and consumer goods dominated world media and markets, 
and as a result its claim to being the “sole superpower”. (236) 
_______________________________________________________ 
234. Newsweek 1993. 1 February: 14 
235. Urnov, A 1982. South Africa against Africa. Moscow: Progress Publishers. 238 
236. Namibia Today 1992. 28 February – 5 March: 1-2    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 127
What were the real economic, political and strategic interests of successive 
US administrations in Southern Africa?  Was the removal of the MPLA 
government from power in Angola of sufficient national importance to merit 
the US almost direct interventions in the sub-region?  Or was it of real US’ 
national interests to prevent the attainment of power by a SWAPO 
administration in an independent Namibia?  Once again, the answers are 
obvious, and a resounding “yes” – to counter the Sovietization of the 
Southern African sub-continent, given its strategic location and vast strategic 
resources for the West’s industries, such as oil, diamonds and gold.  Africa’s 
growing importance as a US energy supplier and its continued significance 
to the latter’s security of late became very much pronounced.  These led to  
shifts in the US-African policies – anti-terrorism replaced anti-communism.  
American diplomatic thinking concluded that Washington must continue to 
view Africa as important, both for its resources and the necessity of 
maintaining stability there as a bulwark against global terrorism. (237) 
 
 
Undoubtedly, the US foreign policy had been marked by its multi-faceted 
scopes of intentions, policy shifts and images throughout most of the last 
two centuries.  It has been the major factor in weighing the balance of power 
in the world, during peacetime and in periods of war.  President Ronald 
Reagan perhaps more than any other leader of the United States, shifted this 
balance of power to a point where the international community was no 
longer divided into competing ideological camps. (238) 
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Realizing that the Soviet Union’s political and military threat was becoming 
a reality and that the US security interests were at stake, it became crystal 
clear that it was neither plausible nor possible for the US to linger on. 
Therefore the reigning-in of the Soviet Union’s allies in Southern Africa and 
elsewhere.  These objectives were set to avoid an Afghanistan scenario of 
the earlier decades.  A policy of containment through economic aid and 
direct military involvement in countries perceived to be threatened by 
communist take-over was then enunciated.  Liberation movements such as 
the MPLA, SWAPO and the ANC in the Southern African region were 
singled out for retribution, because of their close alliances with Cuba and the 
then Soviet Union. (239) 
 
 
Most contemporary political analysts and scholars alike characterized US 
African policies as wrought with double standards and ascribed this to its 
inability to appreciate African political and diplomatic strategies.  Now what 
do we read in such an analysis?  Liberation leaders throughout the world had 
been very much circumspect about the US policies in Africa as these were 
perceived as the vehicle to transplant Western imperialism in the face of 
abject poverty on the African continent. Hence their alliances and 
allegiances to the East that sought to create a global equalitarian society.  
Liberation movements in their quest for national independence and self-
determination sought and received assistance from the ten Soviet Union and 
other Eastern Bloc counties in the absence of such support from the West.    
_________________________________ 
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It has always been Africa’s collective determination and aspiration to 
broaden its continental interests to include peace for all, security everywhere 
and prosperity for everyone in line with the United Nations Charter.  After 
all, democracy is about choices and has its own traditions, values, moral 
systems and opinions.  It differs from place to place, region to region and 
from continent to continent.  This is exactly what was demonstrated in the 
sub-region, subsequent to the elections held by November 1989 in Namibia, 
September 1992 in Angola, and the first democratic election of 1994 in 
South Africa, which saw the coming to power of liberation movements, then 
regarded as the arch adversaries to the US-African policies. (240) 
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